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ABSTRACT 
A state centric approach to policing has had a detrimental effect on security governance in 
South Africa. This approach is an enduring legacy of the Hobbesian worldview which places 
the state at the centre of security governance. However, the multiplicity of policing actors 
throughout the history of South Africa undermines the notion that the SAPS have monopoly 
on security governance. The popularity of the state police in the public’s perception of 
security governance highlights a need of a policing approach which gives the SAPS a role as 
well as acknowledges other policing actors; minimal policing is a plausible alternative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Westphalian model of governance is based on the ‘Peace of Westphalia, which ended the 
Thirty Years War (1648) in Europe, is taken to mark the beginning of the modern 
international system as a universe composed of sovereign states, each with exclusive 
authority within its own geographic boundaries.’1 Hobbes expanded on this principle and 
asserted that the sovereign state needs to be at the centre of security governance in a 
jurisdiction to preserve peace.2 This Hobbesian influence which places the state at the centre 
of security governance has been enduring. In South Africa, the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) has attempted to monopolise policing despite notions prevalent in the early 1990s, 
concerning the importance of democratic policing, which for example, promotes partnership 
policing. Dirk van Zyl Smit and Elrena van der Spuy have pointed out;  
‘it is true that in South Africa, as elsewhere in the transitional world, reform of policing 
in its widest sense has been reduced to a much narrower reorganisation of law 
enforcement. The grand alliance of state, market and civil society in pursuit of the 
‘governance of security’ as originally anticipated, has failed to materialise.’3 
 
 The SAPS is by no means unique in this desire to monopolise policing; it is ‘an international 
phenomenon.’4 Indeed, research on policing in Australia and the United Kingdom show that 
the police attempt to remain at the centre of security governance.5 However, a state centric 
approach to policing is not necessarily desirable, particularly in a developing country such as 
South Africa in which the state may lack the resources and capability to provide efficient 
security to citizens.  
 
For instance, in South Africa the two key policing policy documents: The 1996 National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)6 and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security7 
highlight the limitations of the state and advocate a collaborative, multi-agency approach to 
                                                
1 Stephen, Krasner ‘Compromising Westphalia’ (1995) 20 International Security 115.  
2 Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan Malcolm, Noel (ed) (2012)  
3 Van Zyl Smit, Dirk and Van der Spuy, Elrena ‘Importing criminological ideas in a new democracy: Recent 
South African experiences’, in Tim Newburn and Richard Sparks (eds) Criminal justice and political cultures: 
National and international dimensions of crime control (2004)  
4 Marks, Monique, Shearing, Clifford and Wood, Jennifer ‘Who should the police be? Finding a new narrative 
for community policing in South Africa’ (2009) 10 Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 
149. 
5 Johnston, Les ‘‘Keeping the family together’: Police community support officers and the ‘police extended 
family’ in London’ (2007) 17 Policing and Society 135 
6 Department of Safety and Security, National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) 
7 Department of Safety and Security, White paper on safety and security: In service of safety1999-2004 (1998) 
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policing. The NCPS recognised that in post-apartheid South Africa a network of security 
providers as opposed to just the state police would be needed to effectively tackle policing.8 
The White Paper on Safety and Security attempted to clarify some of the ideas from the 
NCPS and identified the role of various government departments from the local to national 
level that can collaborate in the area of crime prevention. This multi-agency approach is not a 
new concept in South Africa. During the apartheid period the states’ approach to policing was 
based on the acknowledgment that the state police was not in a position to provide adequate 
security provision by themselves.9 In black areas people were responsible for their own 
security governance as the state police was more concerned with addressing resistance to the 
apartheid state than security provision.10 Furthermore, in the mid-1970s the South African 
apartheid government facilitated the growth of the private security industry. This was 
achieved by recruiting the services of private security in strategic places as defined by the 
National Key Points Act 1980, because the state police was considered as lacking capacity to 
adequately provide security, during this period of heightened political tension.11 Despite 
forward looking policies, implementation has been weak and the police have sought to be at 
the centre of policing. This dissertation will show that this state centric approach to policing 
has been a failure that has proven to be resource intensive and unsustainable for the 
government.  
 
Although the NCPS and the White Paper are useful policy documents they do not adequately 
address implementation strategies. This is challenging for the government because it has to 
implement policies to address crime without a clear ‘single composite framework’ resulting 
in oscillating policy positions: from crime prevention to a ‘war on crime’ approach.12 The 
high crime rates in South Africa, offer a partial explanation to the popularity of the ‘war on 
crime’ approach to policing because the government and politicians are under pressure to 
address the crime problem. Furthermore, this ‘war on crime’ has also resulted in the 
militarisation of the police with human rights issues being perceived to be getting in the way 
of fighting crime. Therefore, resources spent on the ‘war on crime’ have resulted in a shift 
                                                
8 Shaw, Mark and Shearing, Clifford ‘Reshaping Security: An Examination of the Governance of 
Security in South Africa’ (1998) 7 African Security Review 8 
9 Ibid at 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Singh, Anne-Marie Policing and Crime Control in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2008) 
12 Van der Spuy, Elrena ‘ Crime and its Discontent: Recent South African Responses and Policies’ in Crime and 
Policing in Transitional Societies Conference (2000) 167 available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_4865-
1522-2-30.pdf?040622164853 , accessed on 11 November 2013.  
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towards emphasis being placed on crime control at the expense of the long term crime 
prevention policies in addressing crime.13 The result has been that crime prevention has been 
reduced either to mere political rhetoric or at best to a narrow focus on reforming the criminal 
justice system.14 This, however, does not suggest that the state has no role to play in policing.  
 
1.2 Relevance of topic 
 
Garland15 and Hillyard and Tombs16 amongst others have asserted that high crime rates have 
become an accepted feature of modern social life. Policy makers, civil society, private 
businesses and academics have attempted to address the challenges of security governance in 
modern society. A review of literature highlights two approaches to security governance: the 
state centric approach that argues that security is a public good best provided by the state and 
the nodal approach that argues that empirical reality determines which policing actor should 
be at the centre of security governance, the state need not normatively be at the centre. The 
state centric approach to policing has proven popular in South Africa. This research question 
is relevant because it outlines the detrimental effects of the state centric approach on policing 
and seeks to offer an alternative policing model; minimal policing as advocated by Marks and 
others. Minimal policing gives the state police an indispensable position in security 
governance based on a clearly defined role which acknowledges that the state cannot have 
monopoly in policing thus supports and recognises non-state policing actors.17  
 
1.3 Research question 
 
This dissertation aims to outline the effects of a state centric approach on policing in South 
Africa. Below is the proposed structure of the dissertation. 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Garland, David ‘The limits of the sovereign states: strategies of crime control in contemporary society’ (1996) 
36 The British Journal of Criminology 448. 
16 Hillyard, Paddy and Tombs, Steve ‘Beyond Criminology’, in Hillyard, Paddy, Pantazis, Christina, Tombs 
Steve, Gordon, Dave (eds) Beyond Criminology (2004) 13. 
17 Marks, Monique and Wood, Jennifer ‘South African policing at a crossroads: The case for a ‘minimal’ and 
‘minimalist’ public police’ (2010) 14 Theoretical Criminology 326. 
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Ø Chapter 2: State-centred v. Nodal theory 
This chapter will analyse the nodal model to policing advanced by Clifford Shearing and his 
colleagues. The nodal model is based on the premise that modern society comprises plural 
centres of security governance. Therefore, this model views the state as ‘one’ node among 
many nodes and refuses to give the state conceptual priority. This approach has been 
criticised by Loader and Walker (2006) who argue that the state should be at the centre of 
policing provision as security is a public good. In a developing country such as South Africa, 
the state may lack the necessary capacity to have a monopoly on security governance or to 
successfully ‘anchor’ security networks; therefore the nodal approach is better suited as it 
recognises that different policing actors play a unique role in security provision without 
giving conceptual priority to any one node in light of empirical contexts. 
Ø Chapter 3: A historical overview of shifts in policy objectives  
  
This chapter will outline the changes in government policy on policing in South Africa. 
Examining shifts in policy is important because it highlights the tendency of the state to 
revert to a state centric approach to policing despite evidence that a non-state centric 
approach is more appropriate. The NCPS and White Paper on Safety and Security which 
advocate for multiple policing actors working in partnership to implement crime prevention 
initiatives have been abandoned for the ‘war on crime’ state centric approach to policing.   
Ø Chapter 4: Partnership policing: private security  
This chapter builds on the previous chapters; partnership policing was advocated in the NCPS 
and White Paper on Safety and Security. The relationship between the state and the private 
security will be examined because South Africa has one of the largest private security 
industries in the world. The indispensable role of private security in the security governance 
of South Africa undermines any notion of state monopoly on policing. This chapter is 
relevant because it highlights that a state centric approach to policing has undermined 
partnership policing. 
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Ø Chapter 5:  Partnership Policing: community policing  
  
This chapter is an extension of Chapter 4 but will examine partnership policing from the 
perspective of community policing. Community policing is important because in the early 
1990s it was advocated as the vehicle to build the relationship between the SAPS and the 
community after the years of police brutality under the apartheid regime. The chapter will 
assess the implementation of the government policing on community policing and also 
evaluate the role of Community Police Forums (CPFs). The chapter is relevant because it 
highlights the adverse effect of a state centric approach in the implementation of community 
policing. The Khayelitsha Commission into Policing will also be examined because it 
highlights the lack of capability of the SAPS to provide adequate security for all citizens.  
 
Ø Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The dissertation will conclude that policies on security governance need to be grounded in 
reality in order for implementation to occur. Minimal policing is a plausible alternative to 
address the tendency for the state to adopt a state centric approach to policing. This is 
because it is grounded in reality; the SAPS are given a role that recognises the unique 
capability and resources while the role of non-state policing actors is also acknowledged. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
This is a desktop review of secondary data collection. Merriam has rightly pointed out that 
‘documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and 
discover insights relevant to the research problem.’18 Desktop analysis of documents has 
various advantages that include being cost-effectiveness and availability.19 However, this 
type of research also has the disadvantage of lacking sufficient detail and susceptibility to 
bias; some academic articles and government policy reports are written for a specific purpose 
and to promote a certain ideology. Therefore, primary research in addition to desktop review 
of data would have been ideal in order to mitigate issues of unreliable and outdated secondary 
information; however time constraints made primary research unpractical. 
                                                
18 Merriam, Sharan Case study research in education: A qualitative approach (1988) 118. 
19 Glenn, Bowen ‘Document analysis as a qualitative research method’ (2009) 9 Qualitative Research Journal 
31-32. 
10 
 
 
 
 
To write this dissertation, I looked at academic journal articles, books, policy documents, 
legislation, and newspapers. Access to this information was mostly through the UCT library 
database. Google scholar was also used to access academic articles. Government websites 
were used to attain policy documents. Various online websites were used to access relevant 
newspaper articles and useful documents.  
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CHAPTER 2: STATE CENTRED VS NODAL THEORY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter outlines different theoretical paradigms: state centred and the nodal approach to 
security governance. I argue that the nodal approach is best placed to address the policing 
challenges in South Africa because it does not make the normative claim that the state should 
monopolise policing. It urges for an empirical approach and recognises that for instance; non-
state actors such as private security may be important nodes in security provision. The nodal 
approach is therefore, a more realistic and practical approach that can potentially result in the 
adoption and implementation of policing policies that: encourage partnership between state 
and non-state policing actors, address the sensitive issue of unequal security and 
accountability of non-state policing actors.  
 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section critically assesses the nodal 
model advanced by Shearing and his colleagues. The nodal model rejects the state centric 
approach to policing that argues for the state to always be at the centre of policing and 
advocates that we should not give conceptual priority to any node. The second section 
examines Loader and Walker’s ‘state-anchored pluralism’ model which places the state at the 
centre of policing governance. The chapter concludes that both the nodal model and the state-
anchored pluralism model are more similar than different as both models are concerned with 
providing equitable policing provision. The nodal approach is better suited to a developing 
country such as South Africa which has ‘areas of limited statehood’ such as Khayelistsha; 
spaces in which the ability of the state to enforce law and order is limited.20 Therefore, like 
advocated by the nodal approach both state and non-state policing actors should be supported 
to promote rule of law principles in the provision of policing services to citizens. 
 
2.2 NODAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
 
A brief outline of the Hobbesian worldview will be useful to set the context for an 
understanding of the state centric approach to policing that is rejected by the nodal approach. 
The framework for the state centric approach to policing is based on the Hobbesian 
                                                
20 Honke, Jana Transnational companies and security governance (2013) 1. 
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worldview which advocates for state authority over civil society to facilitate peace; ‘during 
the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition 
which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man.’21 The Hobbesian 
worldview perceives of sovereignty as state authority to use force in exercising its mandate to 
protect the citizenry. The notion that the state is viewed as best placed to provide security for 
all is based on the assumption that non-state actors are undemocratic.22 The state centric 
approach to policing has been a defining feature of the Westphalian model of governance 
which states that the sovereign state has ‘exclusive authority within its own geographic 
boundaries.’23 State sovereignty is a complex political concept but the wider meaning for the 
purposes of this dissertation is that the state has the capacity to control a territory against 
threats from both internal and external forces, as well as to protect its citizens from crime and 
‘criminal depredations.’24 The Hobbesian concept that the state has legitimate monopoly over 
security governance in a given jurisdiction is based on this understanding of sovereignty. 
Indeed, the Hobbesian vision of state governance is accurately illustrated in the giant 
Leviathan whose body comprises of the people who have elected him to be their legitimate 
ruler.25 The Leviathan carries in the left hand a sceptre that symbolises his legitimacy and the 
right hand a sword which is a symbol of his physical power to ‘crush resistance to his rule.’26 
This idea is further expressed in the notion of the state police as the ‘thin blue line’ that 
through the use of force can bring order and prevent anarchy. However, the nodal theorists 
argue that this Hobbesian and Westphalian worldview is inaccurate and fails to depict the 
reality of plural sites of security governance with a multiplicity of policing actors.  
 
 Kempa et al have rightly asserted that we now live in a ‘post- Westphalian’ era with multiple 
sites of governance and ‘policing is a central function of governance.’27 Despite the wide 
usage of the term ‘governance’, there lacks consensus on the definition of the term. Sand 
(2004) quoted in Burris et al (2008) has asserted that the literature on governance is 
                                                
21 Hobbes op cit (n2). 
22 Marks, Monique and Goldsmith, Andrew ‘The State, the People and Democratic Policing: the Case of South 
Africa’, in Wood, Jennifer and Dupont, Benoit (eds) Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security 
(2006). 
23 Stephen D. Krasner Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political  Possibilities (2001) 24. 
24 Garland op cit (n15) 448. 
25 Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood  ‘Nodal Governace, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens’ (2003)  30 
Journal of Law and Society 1. 
26 Ibid at 1. 
27 Kempa, Michael, Stenning, Philip and Wood, Jennifer ‘Policing Communal Spaces: A Reconfiguration of the 
‘Mass Private Property’ Hypothesis’ (2004) 44 British Journal of Criminology 562. 
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“numerous, diverse and fragmented, and has not formed any consistent tradition.”28 Burris et 
al have highlighted that the popularity of governance as a topic risks the danger of ‘becoming 
a point of false rhetorical convergence, a term that means all things to all people.’29 Despite 
these challenges, Kempa et al have defined governance as the ‘organized efforts to manage 
the course of events in a social system.’30 Security governance is therefore, complex, with 
plurality of actors.31 This complexity effectively undermines the state centric approach to 
policing because the state lacks capability to be solely responsible for security governance in 
a dynamic environment. 
 
Agnew has made a convincing argument that undermines the Westphalian model of 
governance, particularly the understanding pertaining to the sovereign state. He argues that 
the political authority of the sovereign state is ‘not necessarily predicated on and defined by 
strict and fixed territorial boundaries.’32 This is because, firstly, political authority is defined 
as ‘the legitimate exercise of power’ and the basis of this legitimacy is not consistent across 
time and space, for example, the legitimate rule by the monarchy in medieval Europe is 
different from the modern legitimate basis of Western democracies.33 Secondly, especially in 
the age of ‘globalization’ authority is not derived from the state alone but from a wide range 
of sources such as international businesses and civil society movements.34 Similarly, 
Braithwaite states: ‘the corporatization of the world during the twentieth century....meant that 
the greatest regulatory capabilities lay with corporations themselves...by the mid-90s for the 
first time, a majority of the largest ‘economies’ in the world were transnational corporations 
rather than states.’35 Notwithstanding, the exact influence of transnational corporations on 
state sovereignty, the fact still remains that the state is no longer the primary actor 
domestically or the international arena. Therefore, the state lacks the basis to claim monopoly 
of security governance in a given jurisdiction.  
                                                
28 Burris, Scott, Drahos, Peter and Shearing, Clifford ‘Changes in Governance: A Cross-disciplinary review of 
current scholarship’ (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1 
29 Ibid at 7. 
30 Kempa, Michael, Shearing, Clifford and Burris, Scott ‘Changes in Governance: A Background 
Review’(2004) available at 
http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/phrhcs/salzburg/Global_Health_Governance_Review.pdf accessed on 17 
March 2014 p2. 
31 Ibid at 3-4. 
32 Agnew, John ‘Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World 
Politics’(2005) 95 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 441. 
33 Ibid at 441. 
34 Ibid at 442. 
35 Braithwaite, John ‘The New regulatory state and the transformation of criminology’ (2000) 40 The British 
Journal of Criminology 229. 
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Agnew’s point about authority being derived from a wide range of sources is closely related 
to Foucault’s (1990) argument concerning ‘governing through enrolment.’36 Foucault (1990) 
argues that the power of governance is widely shared.37 Power is understood as being 
everywhere because it is not possible for one person to own, possess or hoard.38 Power 
should be understood not as the sole possession of one person but according ‘to the number 
of other people who enter into the composition.’39 The power to govern is derived from the 
ability to enrol others to work in fulfilling one’s objectives; which is exercising ‘governance 
at a distance.’40 Again, it therefore follows that the state cannot be in sole possession of the 
power to exercise security governance. 
 
In response to the plural actors and dynamics of security governance, Shearing and his 
colleagues have advocated for a nodal approach to policing. A node is ‘not a virtual entity’ 
but has ‘some institutional form’ with the necessary ‘stability and structure to enable the 
mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time.’41 Although the nodal 
position acknowledges that some nodes such as the state are bigger than others, the nodal 
approach does not give conceptual priority to the state. Therefore, Shearing rejects the 
Hobbesian view of the state and asserts that the state police are one node ‘among many’ 
policing providers.42 Bayley and Shearing argue that the drastic changes in policing 
governance have resulted in the state losing its perceived monopoly, if there ever was a 
monopoly on policing.43 They claim that ‘modern democratic countries...have reached a 
watershed in the evolution of their systems of crime control...[and] [f]uture generations will 
look back on our era as a time when one system of policing ended and another took its 
place.’44 This is particularly evident with the rise of private security which operates in all 
spheres of private and public life. However, Crawford (1999)45 and Jones and Newburn 
                                                
36 Foucault, Michel The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (1990). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Latour, Bruno ‘The powers of association’, in Law, John (ed.) Power, Action and Belief: 
a New Sociology of Knowledge? (1986) 265. 
39 Ibid at 265. 
40 Ibid at 265. 
41 Kempa, Shearing & Burris (n30) 12. 
42 Shearing, Clifford ‘Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments’, in Wood, Jennifer and 
Dupont, Benoit (eds) Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security (2006) 27. 
43 Bayley, David and Shearing, Clifford ‘The Future of Policing’ (1996) 30 Law and Society Review 
44 Ibid at 585. 
45 Crawford, Adam. The local governance of crime: Appeals to community and partnerships (1999) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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(2002)46 have questioned the assumption by Bayley and Shearing47 that the current policing 
practices are ‘watershed’ moments that differ from past practices. This is because an 
examination of the historical processes shows that ‘policing provision has become less rather 
than more fragmented.’48 While there have been far reaching changes, there has also been as 
identified by Boutellier and Van Steden ‘consistencies and continuities that still exist in the 
authorization and provision of policing.’49 Jones and Newburn assert that the decline of 
‘secondary social control’ agents for example, the caretakers who performed the surveillance 
function created a security vacuum that has been filled by private security.50  Therefore, the 
rise of private security is merely an increase ‘in a general trend towards the formalisation of 
social control.’51 Although Jones and Newburn make an important observation, the relevant 
point for the purposes of my argument remains undisputed; in fact Bayley, Shearing, Jones 
and Newburn are in agreement that policing has never been adequately provided by the state 
alone. The exception of this is the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of policing in the 1950s in which 
the United Kingdom metropolitan police was viewed to have successfully fulfilled their 
duties.52 Scholars such as Reiner have questioned the reliability of the statistics collected 
during this period; for example challenges of underreporting of crime were and are still 
widespread.53 
 
Notwithstanding, the extent nature of policing continuity or break from the past, it is clear 
that the state centric approach to policing is not an accurate depiction of security governance 
in the modern society. There have been changes in ‘rhetorical aspirations’ that the state 
should govern the public arena for the public good and leave the private sphere to self-govern 
within broad limits within the law.54 Burris et al assert that ‘rhetorical aspirations reached its 
institutional apotheosis in the middle decades of the 20th century, and have been in 
accelerating decline’ since the rise of ‘globalization’ which is linked to the information 
                                                
46 Jones, Trevor and Newburn, Tim ‘The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current Trends in Policing 
Systems’ (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 129-146. 
47 Bayley & Shearing op cit (n43) 585. 
48 Jones & Newburn op cit (n46) 136. 
49 Boutellier, Hans, and Ronald van Steden ‘Governing nodal governance: The ‘anchoring’ of local security 
networks’’ (2011) International and comparative criminal justice and urban governance. Convergences and 
divergences in global, national and local settings. 
50 Jones & Newburn op cit (n46). 
51 Ibid at 139. 
52 Robert Reiner ‘Policing a Postmodern Society’ (1992) 55 The Modern Law Review 761.  
53 Ibid at 768. 
54 Burris et al op cit not (n28) 14. 
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economy.55 The information economy has opened new spaces such as cyber space and is 
governed according to the interests of non-state actors who affect the public interest.56 More 
importantly, this neat distinction between private and public space is no longer relevant 
because of the rise of what Shearing and Stenning have labelled ‘mass private property.’57 
Mass private property is private property that has the appearance of a public space that is 
open to all citizens. However, although, these mass private properties appear to be public 
spaces, they are not public in the conventional meaning of the term.58 This is because access 
to the space is dependent on invitation and compliance of the requirements demanded by 
private owners who govern the space using the services of private security.59 On the other 
hand, the apparent division between public and private; 
‘has always been an inspirational rather than an empirical distinction... [as] these... 
spheres have always..been hybrids.’60 Kempa et al go further, and assert that the 
public-private sphere distinction has not only become blurred into hybrid spheres but 
they argue that the distinction itself is invalid.61  
 
This blurring between public and private space undermines a state centric approach to 
policing because the state lacks jurisdiction to act in private or hybrid spaces unless they are 
invited by property owners.  
 
Similarly, the state centric approach to policing is not consistent with the practical reality of 
policing in the developing world; it is empirically obvious that the state never had any form 
of monopoly. Baker’s research has shown that the state police in Africa have failed to replace 
non-state policing actors because the state police are ‘widely perceived, as indifferent, inept, 
inefficient and corrupt.’62 Furthermore, in South Africa for example, the state police is absent 
from rural areas and security governance has been the responsibility of the local 
community.63 Baker argues that non-state policing in Africa has legitimacy because it is 
determined by ‘local historical, social, economic and political circumstances’ which is to the 
contrasted with the state police which is arguably a foreign concept introduced by colonial 
governments.64 However, Nina and Scharf have pointed out that state and non-state policing 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Shearing & Wood op cit note (n25) 409. 
58 Ibid at 410. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Kempa et al op cit note (n30) 15. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Baker, Bruce Multi-Choice Policing in Africa (2008) 74-75. 
63 Scharf, Wilfried ‘Justice and Community Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2001) 32 IDS Bulletin. 
64 Baker op cit (n62) 100. 
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actors interact in a complex political and social spectrum that is at one hand cooperative and 
the other hand non-cooperative; there is no simplistic dichotomy between state and non-state 
policing actors with the state having the upper hand.65 Baker has described the diversity of 
policing actors in African countries as ‘multi-choice policing’ as people have a wide array of 
policing actors to choose from that are appropriate to their particular needs; this reiterates the 
inability of the state to exercise monopoly on security governance.66 
 
This section has shown that a state centric approach to policing is misleading and inconsistent 
with historical and modern traditions; policing has been provided by multiple actors 
especially in developing countries such as South Africa.67 Furthermore, the rise of mass 
private property, security networks and non-traditional crime such as cybercrime has not only 
eroded the traditional public and private policing distinction but undermines the argument 
that the state should have monopoly on policing. New understandings of security governance 
emphasise the importance of placing both state and non-state actors as relevant in policing 
provision. 
 
2.3 STATE-ANCHORED PLURALISM IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
 
      2.3.1 The state anchored approach: 
 
This section will discuss the state anchored approach. This approach is state centric and 
argues that the state should always be at the centre of security governance. Loader and 
Walker have proposed the anchored pluralism approach as an alternative to the nodal model 
of policing governance. Loader and Walker have questioned the practical application of the 
nodal approach which refuses to give the state a privileged position. Loader and Walker68 
criticism of the nodal theory is based on the position that the state is required to monitor and 
regulate other policing nodes to ensure they are consistent with the rule of law. This 
effectively means that ‘the state in fact continues to assume a far from insignificant role in 
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their preferred conception of security.’69 However, this critique of the nodal theory assumes 
that the state is the only entity that can regulate and monitor other policing nodes; private 
security is arguably effectively regulated through the market.70   
 
     2.3.2 Policing as a public good 
 
The anchored pluralism approach attempts to place the state at the centre of security 
governance because security is viewed to be a public good.  Loader builds on the work 
of Manning (1997)71 to argue that at least in the UK, the public police hold a “sacred” 
symbolic role of ‘law, order and nation.’72 The symbolic power held by the police is 
explained by Bourdieu’s (1991) thesis on symbolic power.73 Bourdieu argues that 
symbolic power is the tacit power exercised obliviously by a person in a position of 
authority to make people willingly conform to a particular worldview without putting up 
resistance.74 Loader and Walker (2007) argue that security is a ‘thick’ public good.75 
Security as a ‘thick’ public good consists of two dimensions; the first dimension entails 
freedom from fear, although this freedom is subjective as it is based on one’s perception 
and experience of a particular social environment and the adequacy of its safety 
mechanisms.76 Secondly, security as a public good presupposes a recognisable public 
that possesses collective interests.77 This argument goes beyond the ‘thin’ public good 
perception of security rooted in the political theory of social contract advanced by 
Hobbes and Locke which is essentially security is pursued by the collective based 
upholding mutual interests.78 Loader and Walker are arguing that security and 
particularly the pursuit of security is the glue that holds political communities together.  
Similarly Bayley argues for state policing in a plural policing environment;  
governments will inevitably remain central to crime prevention in 
modern societies-not because other institutions are not important but 
because the state cannot renounce the responsibility. The maintenance of 
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domestic order is as crucial to the legitimacy of government as defence 
against external enemies.79  
 
Loader and Walker assert that security as a public good has an instrumental role in the ‘very 
making and sustenance of the collective project of common “publicness.”’80 Therefore, the 
commodification of security services is problematic because it has undermined ‘people’s 
capacity to enact inclusive, negotiated solutions to the problem of order, such as those 
promised by community mediation.’81 This destroys the “thickness” of social bonds in 
society and makes it more difficult to link policing issues to democratic values such as 
equality and justice.82 Furthermore, commodification of security services effectively means 
that the consumers of these services have ‘turned their backs on democratic politics as a 
means of providing policing and security, and opted instead to exercise what control they can 
by market means which excludes poor communities who cannot afford this option.’83 Marks 
and Goldsmith agree with this point and argue that the state centric approach to policing can 
address the issue of unequal policing provision which places poor communities in South 
Africa at a disadvantage.84 They argue that for poor communities ‘while the state may be 
distant, the alternatives too often are unaffordable and/or unpalatable.’85 Similarly, Marks and 
Wood (2010) assert that non-state policing actors can be susceptible to becoming heavy 
handed and undermine democratic principles that value individual human rights.86 However, 
this position presupposes that the state is not susceptible to undemocratic policing. Indeed, 
Loader and Walker have acknowledged the importance of curbing the arbitrary power of state 
policing.87 
 
The concept of policing being a public good has been challenged by the work of Crawford 
who advances the notion that policing is a club good. Webster suggests that ‘most public 
realms serve particular publics and are better conceived of as club realms.’88 Samuelson 
(1954) distinguished between a “pure public good pure private good” dichotomy: with public 
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good characteristics being “non-excludable,” “indivisible” and “non-rival.”89 Non-excludable 
is defined as goods provided for all, indivisibility means that the good has to be consumed as 
a whole and non-rivalry means that the ‘one person’s consumption of the good does not 
prevent someone else from using it.’90 Crawford argues that few goods possess all three 
qualities and qualify to be identified as “pure public goods.”91 Many public goods ‘suffer 
congestion’ and thus a distinction “between “pure public goods” and “crowded public goods” 
is needed, with the latter being limited in supply thus could be described as “ ‘quasi’ or semi-
public goods.’92 These quasi/semi public goods can be understood to be club goods, the term 
‘club’ being appropriate because these goods are ‘available to members of a club but 
restricted in some form or other to non-members.’93 Club goods have an inclusion and 
exclusion dynamic to them which is clearly evident in public policing, enjoyment of the 
policing service ‘is not necessarily without limit within a society.’94 For example, limitations 
can be placed by virtue of municipality boundaries.  
 
This section highlights the challenging issue of security being a public good that is 
supposedly best provided by the state because it is not motivated by profit unlike some non-
state policing actors such as private security. Furthermore, advocates of the state anchored 
approach argue that the state is able to curb the undemocratic tendencies of non-state policing 
actors. However, this position is undermined by the fact that in developing countries there are 
spaces of limited statehood in which the police lack authority. Policing being a public good 
does not necessarily translate into the state being best placed to provide this service. This is 
particularly evident in developing countries in Africa that face challenges of limited resources 
and police corruption.95   
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has outlined the different theoretical paradigms on policing with the aim of 
arguing that the nodal approach is a more realistic approach to policing for instance, in spaces 
of limited statehood. It is clear that there is consensus on the fact that there exists plurality in 
policing actors. The contentious issue in literature is around the role of the state in this plural 
policing environment. Shearing and his colleagues advocate the nodal model of policing 
which argue for the state to be viewed on conceptual equal footing with other policing actors. 
On the other hand, Loader and Walker take a different approach and advocate for the state to 
be at the centre of policing provision because security is a ‘public good.’ However, asserting 
that policing is a public good is simplistic as Crawford identified in his work on ‘club goods.’  
 
Shearing, Loader and Walker agree on the necessity to ensure that policing provision should 
be equitable and just to all members of society but differ on the mechanisms for doing so: the 
former stating this can be done through the market or co-production to ensure poor 
communities have a say in their security production and the latter stating the state is best 
placed to ensure equitable security provision. It is possible that the state has a role to play 
provided that it is committed to democratic principles. However, this does not suggest that 
the market cannot be regulated to act in a democratic and accountable manner.  In a 
developing country like South Africa with limited resources the state maybe unable to 
provide policing services as advocated by Loader and Walker. Therefore, the nodal approach 
that places state and non-state actors on equal conceptual footing is more appropriate as it 
encourages different actors to bring their strengths in policing and play their unique role in 
the provision of security provision. 
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Chapter 3: A historical overview of shifts in policy objectives 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to evaluate the effects of a state centric approach on policing in South Africa, a 
review of policy is necessary. This chapter will outline the changes in government policy on 
policing in South Africa; varying between the nodal approach on one side to a state centric 
approach on the other. Examining changing policy positions is important because it 
highlights the tendency of the state to revert to a state centric approach on policing despite 
having policy documents that argue otherwise. This chapter will show the negative outcomes 
of shifting towards a state centric approach to policing.  To assess these shifting policy 
positions this chapter will examine the three broad policing approaches taken by the South 
African government: social crime prevention, neo-liberal and ‘war on crime’ approach. 
However, the shifts do not neatly fit in specific time frames as there are a lot of overlaps. As 
mentioned Van der Spuy argues that ‘there is no single composite framework in terms of 
which South African policies regarding crime have been constructed.’96 This can be seen with 
the competing principles with government promoting crime prevention strategies which 
acknowledge the role of poverty and unemployment in crime causation to the ‘war on crime’ 
language which portrays those who commit crime as ‘rational opportunists.’97 Furthermore, 
recent political rhetoric and official government documents still mention the crime prevention 
approach to policing advocated by the NCPS and White Paper on Safety and Security as 
necessary in the long term fight against crime, while implementing the state centric approach 
to policing under the guise of the war on crime. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, the social crime prevention approach to 
policing will be discussed. Secondly, the chapter will assess the neo-liberal approach to 
policing. Thirdly, the ‘war on crime’ response to high crime levels will be discussed.   
 
3.2 SOCIAL CRIME PREVENTION APPROACH (1990/4-1998) 
 
South Africa became a democratic state after holding the 1994 elections which saw the 
African National Congress (ANC) government under President Mandela coming into power. 
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There was a surge in crime post 1994, which resulted in South Africa being described as a 
high level crime society.98 These high crime rates put political and public pressure on the 
newly elected government. In February 1995, President Mandela’s state of the nation speech 
confirmed that government was addressing the issue; 
‘We must take the war to the criminals and no longer allow the situation in which 
we are mere sitting ducks of those in our society who, for whatever reason, are bent 
to engage in criminal and anti-social activities. Instructions have therefore already 
gone out to the minister of safety and security, the national commissioner of the SA 
Police Service, and the security organs as a whole to take all necessary measures to 
bring down the levels of crime.’99  
 
The then National Police Commissioner George Fivaz in response to Mandela swiftly 
revealed the 1995 Community Safety Plan (CSP) which was ‘a package of short-term 
policing measures aimed at tackling the priority crimes in the country.’100 However , in the 
SAPS 1996-1997 Annual Plan, Fivaz stated that ‘Addressing the underlying cause of criminal 
deviance and violence in South Africa is ultimately a long-term priority for government - 
with economic development and nation building (being) key prerequisite to creating safety 
and security.’101 In 1995, again in response to Mandela an interdepartmental team that 
consisted of civilian officials started working on the first National Crime Prevention Strategy 
(NCPS) which was premised on long term crime prevention strategies.102 The NCPS can be 
contrasted from the short term law enforcement orientated CSP.  It is arguable that the 
ideological contest between the SAPS implementing the CSP which emphasises short term 
law enforcement strategies and the civilian officials coming up with a long term crime 
prevention strategy (NCPS) was evident as early on as 1995.103  
 
The NCPS is a crime prevention policy document that was intended to be the framework for 
interdepartmental efforts on crime prevention. It is based on the notion that in order for the 
crime problem to be tackled effectively a paradigm shift is needed; the police should not only 
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focus on crime control but also crime prevention. The 1998 White Paper on Safety and 
Security defined crime prevention as encompassing; 
‘all activities which reduce, deter or prevent the occurrence of specific crimes firstly, by 
altering the environment in which they occur, secondly by changing the conditions 
which are thought to cause them, and thirdly by providing a strong deterrent in the form 
of an effective criminal justice system.’104 
 
 The NCPS advocated for a holistic approach to addressing the crime problem; crime control 
being viewed as reactive and failing to deal with the root of the problem.  The NCPS 
identified areas of crime that are particularly problematic: organised crime, white-collar 
crime, crime involving firearms, crimes against women and children, vehicle hijacking, 
corruption in the justice system and inter-group violent conflict.105 These problematic crime 
areas were to be addressed around the four pillars of the NCPS. The four pillars were: 
• Re-engineering the Criminal Justice System (effective and efficient system that is 
based on crime prevention and upholding human rights principles) 
• Reducing Crime through Environmental Design (reduce environmental opportunities 
for crime) 
• Community Values and Education (seeks to collaborate with communities on crime 
control and prevention strategies)  
•  Transnational Crime (addresses the international organised crime and border 
control).106   
 
The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security attempted to clarify some of the ideas from the 
NCPS and identified the role of various government departments from the local to national 
level that can collaborate in the area of crime prevention.107 The White Paper on Safety and 
Security advocated for a nodal approach to policing by highlighting the need for non-state 
actors to be involved in addressing crime. The White Paper states;  
‘There are many important partners in the fight against crime. These include, among 
others, organisations of civil society, particularly business and community 
organisations, citizens who volunteer for service as Police Reservists as well as the 
private security industry which performs a useful role. The role of such players is, in 
principle, one of partnership with the State.’108 
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Despite the NCPS and White Paper on Safety and Security advocating state and non-state 
crime prevention partnerships implementation has been unsuccessful.109 This may be due to 
the SAPS taking a state centric approach to policing; undermining state and non-state crime 
prevention partnerships.110 This is evident in the preeminent place the state’s criminal justice 
system is given by the SAPS. For example, cybercrime is an example of a security challenge 
that is best addressed using partnership policing. The private industry (internet service 
providers) is better placed to protect the public from cybercrime than the SAPS.111 However, 
the SAPS considers justice administered when an individual has been blamed and punished 
for a crime and would therefore be inclined to take a cybercriminal through the criminal 
justice system which private entities find inefficient, time consuming and expensive.112 
Furthermore, going through the criminal justice system does not necessarily result in 
recovering the financial loss caused by cybercrime.113 Similarly the state centric approach to 
policing is one reason that implementation of the crime prevention strategy has largely been 
narrow and conducted ‘in a piecemeal fashion’ in a manner that reinforces law 
enforcement.114 Indeed, this explains why the first pillar of the NCPS, re-engineering the 
criminal justice system has proved to be the most popular with government departments.115  
 
The NCPS was undermined by shifting government policy from a crime prevention approach 
under the Mandela government to a more aggressive state centric policing approach under the 
Mbeki government. The NCPS was developed under the Mandela government in the same 
vein as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was a policy 
framework that advocated for an integrated, holistic socio-economic policy framework which 
aimed to uplift all South African citizens and create a more equitable society mostly through 
redistribution of wealth.116117 The RDP also identified the need to address crime and causes 
of crime through the utilisation of community policing;  
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‘Adaption and implementation of local crime prevention and crime combating strategies 
according to community needs.’118 Similarly, the NCPS was also a product of the Mandela’s 
government approach to addressing crime using a whole of society approach that engaged 
with the community on crime prevention strategies. However, the realities of political, 
economic and social factors meant that the Mbeki government revised the RDP and NCPS for 
what was considered a more realistic policy; Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
strategy (GEAR) and the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS).119 The RDP and 
NCPS were argued to have been created under the euphoria of the first democratic 
government; and have been viewed as great policy documents that were not very practical 
and effective ‘to real crime control.’120 The next sections will discuss the GEAR and NCCS 
in greater detail.  
 
This section has shown that the first democratic government under Mandela came up with the 
NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security; both forward looking policy documents 
that are in line with the nodal approach to policing as they emphasize state and non-state 
policing partnerships in addressing crime. However, implementation of these policies was 
undermined by a shift towards state centric approaches to fighting crime adopted under the 
Mbeki government.  
 
3.3 NEO-LIBERAL APPROACH  
 
Neoliberalism is a political philosophy that promotes free trade in the global economy with 
limited interference from the state. The political philosopher John Gray encapsulated this by 
stating that; 
‘Every governmental intervention has real costs, and there is strong evidence to 
suggest that the vagaries of governmental policy constitute the chief source of 
economic disturbance in recent decades. It is a general truth … that the imperfections 
of the market are never sufficient to justify intervention.’121  
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The Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) policy adopted under the 
Mbeki government is based on the premise the growth in the economy thorough investment 
in the private sector is needed to achieve the objectives of the RDP.122 This policy has been 
accused of promoting the implementation of neo-liberal policies that are ‘seen to favour big 
business over the working class and its implementation in city councils and municipalities 
has resulted in the collapse of basic services in regions that need them most, notably the 
townships.’123 Neoliberalism as a philosophy is not state centric because the state is not 
placed at the centre of service provision. 
 
     3.3.1 An example of neo-liberal approach to policing 
 
An example of a GEAR inspired project relevant to the subject of policing is the City 
Improvement District initiative (CIDs) being implemented in and around urban spaces 
throughout South Africa. These CIDs are modelled after the Business Improvement Districts 
in American cities. The CIDs comprise of private bodies who had stepped in to fill in the gap 
created by the state in service provision. Needless to say, these CIDs pursue a neoliberal 
approach to achieve urban renewal in the city centre to achieve economic development with 
policing being primarily the responsibility of business owners in the CID.124 The CID in Cape 
Town city centre has been characterised by keeping this business hub a clean and secure 
environment.125 This has essentially meant ‘non-desirables’ which are street vendors, 
homeless and street children have been targeted for expulsion from the city centre.126  Nina 
and Russell have observed that instead of these CID ‘being concerned about individual civil 
rights or human rights, private security of the "new" public space is more concerned about 
how to create conditions which can assist in promoting the logic of capital accumulation and 
the avoidance of any interference with this process.’127 On the other hand, Berg observes that 
CID’s do not in themselves create socio-economic inequalities but simply reflect a pre-
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existing reality and should not be blamed for bringing societal challenges to the surface.128 
Notwithstanding the challenges of social equality the CIDs are relevant because they are an 
example of a nodal approach to policing as security in the CID area is provided by private 
security which is better resourced than the state police; with more personnel, surveillance 
equipment and vehicles to provide effective security for businesses.129 The state police also 
assist when called in by private security; therefore, state and non-state policing actors work in 
‘formal co-operation’ to secure the CID.130 
 
     3.3.2 NEDCOR Project on Crime, Violence and Investment 
 
A discussion on the neo-liberal policy approach is incomplete without mentioning the 
NEDCOR Project on Crime, Violence and Investment. The project was funded by the private 
sector in 1996 in an attempt to identify the cause of the rising crime rates in South Africa and 
give recommendations on what can be done to address the high crime. It is interesting to note 
that the NEDCOR Project was conducted during the same year that the NCPS was enacted, 
when the government was pursuing a crime prevention approach to policing. The NEDCOR 
project identified that the public perceived crime and violence as more problematic than 
unemployment and education.131 The report takes a Hobbesian worldview and argues that 
‘the most basic and fundamental duty of any government – which is why people are willing 
to give the government the right to use force against criminals to protect citizens.’132 The 
NEDCOR Project expressed concern that the; 
‘new democratic government was “soft” on crime which led to the ‘inevitable 
speculation that the country may become “ungovernable.”133 This soft on crime 
perception has resulted in the increased emigration of skilled persons and, it is argued, 
has ‘prevented foreign investment and tourism from increasing substantially.’134 
 
 The NEDCOR report also gives the state primary responsibility on crime prevention contrary 
to the NCPS: it states that ‘if a government continues to fail in the area of crime prevention, it 
will eventually fail in all other areas: investment will cease; unemployment and poverty will 
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increase; development programmes will be perverted; and citizens will leave the country in 
desperation.’135 Samara has convincingly argued that the current discourse in South Africa 
which argues that high levels of crime is a big obstacle to development in the country, results 
in crime being relocated ‘from the realm of development, as a social problem, back into the 
realm of security, as a law enforcement problem.’136 This is unfortunate because instead of 
promoting the nodal approach to policing advocated in the NCPS, it promotes state centric 
approach to policing as the discussion reverts to the state being given primarily responsibility 
to take charge and be responsible for addressing crime. This ignores the fact that the state 
does not have the necessary resources and capabilities to take primary responsibility for 
security provision.  
 
Furthermore, Samara asserts that his research in Cape Town has concluded that the tough 
stance on crime in Cape Town;  
‘is becoming the rationale behind social development efforts, both at the practical and 
conceptual levels. Rather than law enforcement and criminal justice being reformed to 
function as part of broader development initiatives in the townships, they are instead 
becoming stand-ins for social development.’137 
 
 Dixon has highlighted the unfortunate development of ‘criminalizing social policy’; social 
policies such as skills training for the unemployed are implemented not as an end it 
themselves but because they are seen as crime prevention measures.138 Similarly Stan Cohen 
argues that the ‘objective of lower crime rates’ should be ‘independent of and irrelevant to 
the struggle against poverty, inequality and repression.’139 Although, it is important to avoid 
conflating ‘crime prevention with economic and developmental policy, the failure to 
understand crime and its causes in ecological terms in the country will result in future policy 
discussions taking place in an analytical and empirical vacuum.’140 It is clear that giving the 
state primary responsibility for addressing crime will inevitably result in the blurring of social 
development policies with law enforcement; the state has difficulty in having a paradigm 
shift in which crime prevention is separated from a preoccupation with criminal sanctioning 
and punishment. 
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This section has shown that the business community does not share the same view of what 
the appropriate policing model to facilitate development in South Africa should be: the 
NEDCOR Project showed that part of the business community support a Hobbesian state 
centric approach to policing while businesses operating in the CIDs recognise the need for a 
non-state centric approach to policing and seek the services of private security. These 
differing ideologies in the business community which one would assume support a nodal 
approach to policing highlight the enduring popularity of the Hobbesian state. Unfortunately 
this state centric approach to policing is detrimental to government policy making and 
implementation. The pressure to address crime means: firstly, the state loses the incentive to 
pursue social development policies as an end in themselves; leading to the criminalization of 
social policy, secondly, the state loses motivation to implement crime prevention policies 
based on nodal approach to policing.  
 
3.4 THE WAR ON CRIME: (1998- present) 
 
The ‘war on crime’ has been used to describe the adoption of a tough stance on crime by the 
state; consisting of ‘comprehensive police action to exterminate crime by incapacitating 
criminals.’141 Although the NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security have not been 
officially replaced by another policy document, the current Zuma government has continued 
implementing the state-centric war on crime approach adopted under the Mbeki government 
in the late 1990s.  
 
The SAPS was inadequately prepared to deal with the crime crisis that ensued after the end of 
apartheid. Rauch has pointed out that it ‘never occurred to the leaders and members of the 
African National Congress (ANC) – the main democratic opposition party – that the police, 
who had been so ruthlessly effective  against them, would be any less effective against 
criminals in the new era.’142 The apartheid police although effective against opponents of the 
state was not well trained in conducting criminal investigations as most of their criminal 
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investigations relied on confessions most times secured from individuals ‘under duress.’ 143 
Crime control was not a priority for the apartheid government.144  
 
In response to the increasing crime rates in the country the Mbeki administration response 
was to take a ‘war on crime’ stance. The National Commissioner of Police, under the Mbeki 
administration Jackie Selebi, and the Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete took an 
uncompromising tough stance against crime and issued a series of statements that signalled a 
change in tone from the NCPS. In 2009, Tshwete in his address to police officers was quoted 
to have said police should deal with criminals as “a bulldog deals with a bull’ and if human 
rights bodies interfered he would ‘reason with them.”145 Political rhetoric blamed the 
restrictions imposed by the human rights based Constitution which seemingly protected 
criminals and hindered the police from doing its job. 
 
Unfortunately this skewed viewpoint of human rights hindering police officers sheds light on 
the increase of police brutality in South Africa.146 The SAPS have made headlines as a result 
of the killing of Mido Macia a taxi driver from Mozambique and the Marikana massacre in 
which the police opened fire on striking mine workers resulting in 34 deaths.147 While the 
post-apartheid police has undergone a transformation and is required to operate within the 
confines of the law, there has been an increase of unacceptable incidents of police 
brutality.148 Bruce rightly points out that although the police have public sympathy to take a 
tough stance with ‘criminals’ the police management have failed to realise that ‘[u]ltimately 
the SAPS will only be able to build a sense of self-worth among its members and true public 
respect through setting far higher standards for itself than are demanded from it by many 
members of the public.’149 A state centric approach to policing might result in the state police 
being more inward-looking with individual human rights failing to be given prominence.  
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     3.4.1 The National Crime Combating Strategy 
 
The Mbeki administration implemented the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) 
between 2000 and 2009, and it was a crime reduction police strategy that was based on 
focusing on crime ‘hot spots’ throughout the country.  The NCCS was to have two phases: a 
crime reduction phase which consisted of heavy policing in identified high crime areas and 
the stabilisation phase in which implementation of crime prevention strategies would 
occur.150 The NCCS consisted of what has been labelled ‘Operation Crackdown’ because of 
the heavy handed approach to policing by the state.151 Operation Crackdown was an 
intelligence driven endeavour which mapped out the ‘geographical hot spots’ of crime and 
organised crime in particular.152 However, despite the crime prevention rhetoric, no actual 
long term social crime prevention programme was adopted during Operation Crackdown.153 
Matthews has highlighted that Operation Crackdown not only failed to have a long term 
impact on crime rates but resulted in crime displacement as crime simply moved to less 
policed areas.154 Furthermore, he asserts that due to the magnitude and resource intensive 
nature of the exercises, police officers were taken from their stations which impacted on the 
ability of police officers to build relations with their local community.155  
 
The tough on crime strategy has also led to collaborations between the military and the 
SAPS. The routine deployment of the military to perform policing duties, has raised 
questions on whether it is constitutional; ‘the army is not a police fist.’156 Samara’s 
illustration of a joint five hours operation between the SAPS and military in Cape Town 
which involved around 200 personal and consisted of instant roadblocks being enacted in 
high crime spots in which the military airdropped from helicopters and searched 600 cars is a 
good example of these joint operations.157 These collaborations are clearly contrary to the 
community policing approach advocated in the NCPS, nor the best use of resources. This is 
because no serious crimes were identified except traffic violations ranging from failure to 
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show driver’s licence and not wearing seatbelts.158 The operation was symbolic gesture 
because Anton de Cock, the Stellenbosch police spokesperson was quoted to have asserted 
that ‘‘We want to show the criminals that we are here and alert, and show the tourists that we 
are protecting them.”159  
 
In 1998, this tough on crime approach resulted in parliament passing legislation that imposed 
minimum sentences for a range of crimes. However, this legislation was not expected to be 
permanent but viewed as a temporary response to the high increase in crime. For example, in 
the Malgas v The State, Marais pointed out that minimum sentencing ‘intended to be 
relatively short-term responses to a situation which it was hoped would not persist 
indefinitely.’160 Steinberg has argued that ‘the fact that a “temporary” piece of legislation has 
de facto become permanent is, perhaps, a symptom of just how muddled and unconsidered 
Parliament's crime-fighting policies have become.’161   
 
Furthermore, the increase in the number of people going through the criminal justice system 
has clogged the system. This has resulted in overcrowding in the prisons and delays in the 
court system.162 A study conducted by the UNDP (2004) shows that South Africa is the 
highest spender on the criminal justice system in the world. The data compared the spending 
of countries between the period of 1997 and 1998; 2004 and 2005, for example in 2004 South 
African spent $130 per person and the other countries on average spend $66 per person.163 
Despite South Africa having a high budget on the criminal justice system, it seems more 
funds are needed to enable the system to cope with the increase of arrests resulting from the 
tough on crime strategy. This unfortunately takes attention and resources away from crime 
prevention initiatives envisaged in the NCPS.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The state centric ‘war on crime’ policing approach adopted by the government is unfortunate 
because not only does it undermine values underpinning the NCPS but has also  resulted in an 
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increase in police brutality as political rhetoric has eluded to the idea that the constitution 
protects the human rights of ‘criminals’ at the expense of innocent citizens. This undermines 
the argument highlighted in Chapter 2 that the state centric approach to policing is desirable 
as the state is best placed to protect the public interest. This section has also shown that the 
state centric ‘war on crime’ policing approach has failed to deliver and is not sustainable: 
firstly, it is resource intensive and expensive for the state to sustain and secondly, the 
criminal justice system has failed to cope with the increase of people passing through the 
system.  Furthermore, Berg and Shearing argue that the popularity of the punitive criminal 
justice system undermines the implementation of a holistic crime prevention approach to 
security governance.  
 
It is interesting to note that the neo-liberal approach to crime has argued that rising crime 
rates have been an impediment to development in South Africa. This has unfortunately led to 
crime being classified ‘as a law enforcement problem’ again contrary to the NCPS 
position.164  
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CHAPTER 4: PARTNERSHIP POLICING: private security 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 has argued that the state centric approach to policing is misguided and fails to 
consider the complexity and requirements of modern day security governance. Chapter 3 has 
shown that the South African government has forward looking policing documents such as 
the NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security but the tendency to draw back to state 
centric approach to policing result in these policy documents not being implemented. This 
chapter seeks to build upon the previous chapters through discussing partnership policing. 
Partnership policing has been identified as necessary in the NCPS and White Paper on Safety 
and Security to address complex security challenges facing the country; again reinforcing the 
nodal approach to policing which argues that the state need not always be at the centre of 
policing. The chapter will focus on partnership policing between the state and private security 
because private security has become an integral part of security governance in modern 
societies. The preeminent role of the private security in the security governance of South 
Africa undermines any notion that the state has monopoly on policing. This chapter will 
examine the effect that a state centric approach on policing has towards the implementation 
of partnership policing in South Africa. 
 
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will give a historical 
overview of partnership policing. The second section will discuss private security in South 
Africa. Thirdly, the chapter will discuss state and private security partnerships in South 
Africa. Fourthly, brief examples of partnership policing between the state and SAPS will be 
assessed: outsourcing and security governance in the CIDs. Lastly, regulation of the private 
security industry in South Africa will be examined.  
 
4.2 PARTNERSHIP POLICING: the historical overview 
 
For the purpose of this chapter policing partnerships will be defined as Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP). Busch and Givens have described public-private partnerships as 
‘collaboration between a public sector (government) entity and a private sector (for-profit) 
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entity to achieve a specific goal or set of goals.’165 These partnerships can be undermined 
because the private and public entities have different mentalities and approaches to 
policing.166 A nodal perspective refers to ‘mentalities’ as ‘the culture of the node, its way of 
thinking about itself and the world around it.’167 Therefore, the police mentality to policing is 
around law enforcement, processing criminals through the criminal justice system, whereas 
the private security industry mentality has traditionally been around crime prevention and risk 
management, although this is changing.168 The question then becomes, is it possible for state 
and non-state policing actors to have an effective policing partnership? To the extent that the 
state and non-state policing actors have different mentalities, both parties need to have a 
paradigm shift and realise that every policing actor brings different but important perspective 
that is needed for the effective provision of security.  
 
      4.2.1 Influence of neo-liberalism on partnership policing 
 
Neo-liberalism has played an important role in promoting partnerships; neo-liberalism has 
advocated that it is cost effective to enrol different policing actors to work in partnership. 
Neo- liberalism with its emphasis on austerity has resulted in governments around the world 
adopting a “responsibilization” strategy which encourages citizens to take responsibility for 
their own security provision.169 Matthews has rightly observed that ‘[r]responsibility for 
crime control has moved from the centre and is increasingly exercised ‘at a distance’ by a 
combination of statutory, private and voluntary agencies.’170 Kempa et al have described this 
as the state’s attempt to share ‘power as a means of exercising it.’171 However, the ‘rule at a 
distance’ strategy can be undermined by complex and dynamic market conditions; as 
illustrated by the difficulty in regulating service providers and negotiating the expensive 
contracts in the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) an initiative which is part of the broader PPP 
in the United Kingdom.172  
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Secondly, the ‘rule at a distance’ position ‘fails to explore the extent  to which, and the 
manner by which, governance is constituted in relations between plural nodes.’173 However, 
to the extent that this ‘rule at a distance’ policing approach has been successfully 
implemented; the challenge is that in a developing country like South Africa, the ‘rich are 
able to benefit from their capacity for self-direction (e.g. by living in gated communities 
protected by security guards) while the poor are unable to enjoy equivalent benefits.’174 This 
challenge was briefly discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the issue of socio-economic equalities 
in the CIDs. Private security working in gated communities or the Cape Town CID does not 
undermine the necessity of multiply policing actors but simply highlight existing structural 
inequalities in society that are outside the scope of policing policy.  
 
One can argue that the NCPS and White Paper on Safety and Security can be viewed as 
‘responsibilisation strategies to encourage the public to play a part in their own safety’ 
because the government recognised that it was not capable of providing security to all 
citizens by itself.175 Although the White Paper identifies private security as a potential 
policing partner to the SAPS, it unfortunately fails to explain and expand on the nature of the 
partnerships. Clarno and Murray have observed that the relationship between the SAPS and 
private security is characterised by a combination of ‘cooperation and competition.’176 
Chapter 2 highlighted that in the Cape Town CIDs private security and the SAPS have a 
cooperative relationship. The next section will argue that the relationship can be a 
competitive because the SAPS have a tendency of adopting a state centric approach to 
policing. Partnership policing between the state and non-state policing actors is complex 
because of a range of factors that will be discussed in the following sections. There exists 
discrepancy between the official political rhetoric and actual implementation of the policy. 
 
This section has shown that partnership policing derives from a recognition that a single 
policing node is incapable of providing effective security services.177 Indeed, one can argue 
that this responsibilisation strategy is essentially an acknowledgment by the state that it does 
not have the capacity to provide security for citizens.  
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4.3 PRIVATE SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A historical overview 
 
This section will examine private security in greater detail; a historical overview of private 
security in South Africa shows that state and non-state policing partnerships are not a new 
phenomenon.  
 
Private security has a long history which predates the formation of Peel’s 1829 public police. 
Schonteich noted that one of the earliest recorded history of private security were the ‘temple 
priests in the ziggurat at Ur, enlisted by wary Sumerian moneychangers in the third 
millennium BC to protect their lucrative banling operation.’178 Similarly, private security has 
a long history in South Africa. The industry played a central role in policing particularly 
towards the end of the apartheid regime. Shaw argues that during the 1980s the South African 
government actively recruited private security to fill in the security provision gap left by 
SAPS when it was focusing on containing political resistance against the apartheid regime.179 
In 1980, The National Key Points Act was enacted to protect sites that the apartheid state 
considered to the important to national security. This act was a huge boost to the private 
security industry and contracts were lucrative and highly sought after.180 These close links 
with the apartheid government resulted in the private security industry suffering from what 
Shaw has labelled ‘a crisis of legitimacy’ in the first couple of years after 1994.181 After the 
democratic elections of 1994, the relationship between the state and the private security 
industry changed; from the ‘industry being viewed as an ally of the state to a potential 
threat.182 There have been allegations that private security was behind perpetuating political 
unrest in the 1980s and 1990s before the signing of the Unity Accord, and would therefore be 
a threat in the new South Africa.183 The belief was premised on the fact that most of the 
senior police and military personnel under the Apartheid state where now working in the 
private security industry.184  Political rhetoric gave voice to these concerns; with the Deputy 
Minister of Intelligence Services, Joe Nhlanhla (1995), quoted to have stated that; 
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‘third force elements see the private security industry as a haven from where to continue their 
third force activities of destabilisation.’185 This statement shows that the new government felt 
threatened by the private security industry and was therefore not in a position to claim 
monopoly on policing. In fact, one could argue that the government had a huge incentive to 
pursue a nodal approach to policing in order to facilitate partnership with private security and 
change the dynamics of the relationship to create good working relations based on mutual 
trust.  
 
      4.3.1 Growth of the private security industry 
 
Government scepticism failed to have a negative impact on the growth of the security 
industry which  has been described to be one of the largest and fastest growing in the world; 
contributing around 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South Africa.186 The Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) current figures state that there are 400 000 
active security officers which translate to three private security officers for every police 
officer in the SAPS.187 The growth of the private security industry post-1994 has been 
explained by various factors. The retrenchment of the apartheid police and military personnel 
during the transition period in the mid-1990s resulted in most of these former officers moving 
into the private security industry.188 The escalation of crime in the new democratic South 
Africa has also been argued to have played a significant role in the growth of the industry as 
the affluent segment of the society lost faith in the public police and turned to the private 
sector for protection.189 However, Carrier has highlighted the fallacy of this “vacuum” theory 
which states that the rise of private security in South Africa is linked to the security vacuum 
created because the public police was unable to fulfil their role to provide security for 
citizens.190 This “vacuum” theory ignore that the policing approach of the police and private 
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security is different and therefore attract different stakeholders.191 For example Spitzer and 
Scull have observed that private security is popular with the corporate sector as it is more risk 
management focused which better suits the needs of the private sector. Furthermore, private 
security is flexible and ‘can be more readily adjusted to changing levels of consumer 
demand.’192 This is possible through their ability to hire part-time and temporary personnel 
depending on demand.193 The nodal approach to policing is attractive because it is flexible; 
empirical reality should determine which policing actor is at the centre of security 
governance as different security providers have strengths that appeal to different service users 
in specific contexts. 
 
The partnership between the state and private security providers is desirable because it 
acknowledges the different strengths and capabilities of policing actors. This section has 
shown that the apartheid state promoted the nodal approach to policing particularly when 
political unrest was at its highest in the 1980s; the state recognised that it was incapable of 
providing adequate security to all citizens and enrolled the services of private security.  
 
4.4 The SAPS and private security  
 
This section will examine the relationship between the SAPS and private security in South 
Africa. The relationship between the SAPS and private security is important as South Africa 
has been recognised to have one of the biggest private security industries in the world. 
Stenning identified six stages that occur between public and private policing partnerships.194 
The  first stage  consists of denial on the part of the police of the need of partnering with 
private security, the second stage is a begrudging recognition of private policing by the 
police, the third stage consists of hostility in which the police feel undermined and threatened 
by private security providers, the fourth stage is an attempt to regulate private policing 
providers through legislation, the fifth stage is active partnership which is mostly based on 
what Jones and Newburn termed ‘junior-partner’ model.195 This ‘junior-partner’ model is 
                                                
191 Ibid at 38. 
192 Spitzer, Steven and Scull, Andrew ‘Privatization and capitalist development: the case of the private police’ 
(1977) 23 Social Problem 26. 
193 Schonteich, Martin ‘Unshackling the crime fighters: Increasing private sector involvement in South Africa’s 
criminal justice system’ (1999) 14. 
194 Stenning, Philip ‘Private police and public police: towards a redeﬁnition of the police role’ in Loree, Donald 
(ed) Future Issues in Policing (1989) 
195 Jones, Trevor and Newburn, Tim Private Security and public policing (1999) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
41 
 
 
 
state centric in that the police are regarded as the senior partner who does “real policing” with 
private security providers as supporters.196 Shearing argues for a sixth stage in partnership; 
equal partnership.197 The nodal approach advocated by Shearing and his colleagues is 
discussed in Chapter 2; it refuses to give conceptual priority to the state police and asserts 
that empirical reality should determine which actor should be at the centre of security 
governance.  
 
The relationship between SAPS and private security is dynamic, however, at times is based 
on the ‘junior-partner’ model.  This is because the SAPS vision of partnership as identified by 
Minnaar,198 Berg,199 Manzo200  is that they control the relationship with the private security 
providing a supportive role. Nonetheless, the private security industry in South Africa wants 
to be in partnership with SAPS. Therefore it is not surprising that after the 1994 democratic 
elections; individual private security firms approached the SAPS with the view of formalising 
partnerships on ‘an ad hoc basis.’201 In 2013, Jenny Reid writing for the Security Association 
of South Africa stated; ‘The police often do not have the skills or resources that are available 
to the private security industry. Would it not make sense for both parties to serve the people? 
SASA would certainly welcome such a partnership’202 However, it is questionable whether 
the private security industry shares the same vision of the ‘junior-partner’ model advanced by 
the SAPS. In 1996, a number of private security companies submitted a request to the SAPS 
Task Team of Partnership Policing requesting for the extension of  various “ powers and 
rights” to private security officers: such as the use of blue lights on private security “rapid 
response” vehicles.203 These requests were denied, arguably because of the state centric 
approach to policing which argues that the police should be given additional powers because 
they are accountable to the public and have the constitutional mandate to provide security for 
all citizens, whereas the primary concern for private security is protecting their clients.204  
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A review of literature sheds light on further misconceptions: the rise of private security is 
interpreted as a threat to the authority of the state and that private security is comprised of 
‘illegitimate actors’ such as ‘mercenaries.’205 These interpretations fail to grasp ‘the shifting 
structures of security and authority emerging from privatisation.’206 Firstly, the state has 
never had total monopoly of policing and authority is ‘not necessarily a zero - sum game and 
it is equally possible that private force can strengthen and support the authority of the 
state.’207 Chapter 2 discussed the fallacy of the Hobbesian concept which states that the 
public police are best placed to have monopoly on security governance. For example, the rise 
of ‘mass private property;’ public places that are privately owned such as shopping malls 
have changed the policing of space.208 These public spaces by virtue of private ownership are 
primarily policed by private security which means a huge aspect of public life is policed 
privately which calls ‘into question the conventional explanations of the distinction between 
the roles of public and private policing.’209 Stenning has rightly observed that ‘it is now 
almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is not, 
somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in 
democratic societies.’210 However, advocates for a state centric approach to policing suggest 
that private security providing identical services to the state police is somehow undemocratic 
because private security is not accountable to the public but to private clients.211 This position 
fails to acknowledge that the private market can be an effective method of regulation.  
 
Similarly, Loader and Walker argue that private security and other policing actors threaten 
the authority of the state to the extent that they prevent the state from being the ‘anchor of 
collective security provision.’212 This is because the state has the ability to build trust in a 
political community ‘upon which the liberty and security of citizens depend.’213 Ronald van 
Steden and Nalla have asserted that the public police have a unique symbolic role ‘of 
maintaining formal social control.’214 More research is needed to establish whether non-state 
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actors like private security officers can have a similar symbolic role ‘in the public 
imagery.’215 It is arguable that based on the research that is available, private security officers 
in South Africa have direct and indirect sources of power that enables them to maintain 
‘formal social control.’ The direct source of power is from legislation. Although, private 
security personnel have the same legal status of ordinary citizens unlike the public police, 
they still have considerable authority thorough property and contract law to adequately fulfil 
their duties.216 The 1977 Criminal Procedure Act gives private security officers considerable 
powers. Section 42(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states that ‘the owner, lawful 
occupier or person in charge of land’ may arrest any person who is believed to have 
committed or in the process of committing a crime. Schonteich has noted that the private 
security contracts include a clause that states that private security personnel guarding 
property ‘are lawfully in charge of the property they protect.’217 This insertion gives effect to 
the Criminal Procedure Act and grants the security guards complete ‘powers of arrest for any 
offence committed on the property they are assigned to guard.’218 On the other hand, the 
indirect source of private security officers’ power is derived from three sources. Firstly, 
private security officers have significant powers derived from ‘symbolic’ authority acquired 
through the use of uniforms that are similar to the ones used by the public police.219 
Secondly, private security officers have considerable powers by their ability to deny 
individuals access to areas and resources, for example airport departure lounges.220 Lastly, 
private security officers are able to derive power as a result of the public’s ‘misunderstanding 
of the law.’221 The amount of power exercised by private security suggests that the discussion 
should progress from the state centric ‘junior-partner’ model because the state has legitimate 
authority through public accountability to the effective regulation of policing actors (both 
state and non-state) in the age of nodal security governance. The issue of accountability and 
regulation of private security is important and a detailed discussion on the subject will follow 
in the last section of this chapter. 
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This section has shown that the relationship between the SAPS and private security is 
complex and based on the state centric ‘junior-partner’ model. The ‘junior-partner’ model 
derives legitimation from the flawed state centric assumption that the police must be at the 
centre of security governance because it is accountable to the public. This ‘junior partner’ 
model unfortunately fails to adequately capture the enormous power and influence of private 
security. Indeed the highlighting of public accountability of the police as superior to the 
accountability of private security through the market inadvertently does a disservice to the 
discussion of regulating all policing actors in a nodal environment. 
 
     4.4.1 Examples of partnership policing: outsourcing and security governance in the 
CIDs 
 
Partnership between the private sector and the police has primarily been implemented 
through outsourcing. The private security industry is better resourced in comparison to the 
police.222 Outsourcing is defined as ‘the contracting out of certain services to either an 
external company or individual contractor and payment for those services being rendered.’223 
Outsourcing has been conducted in line with the government’s RDP policy which seeks to 
promote communities that have been previously disadvantaged by encouraging them to 
tender for the SAPS outsourcing contracts.224 In considering the outsourcing of services the 
SAPS made the decision not to outsource core policing functions.225 SAPS determine what 
consists of core policing and non-core policing functions.226  For example, SAPS decided that 
using private security to guard prisoners in courts is a non-core activity.227 This emphasis on 
distinguishing core and non-core activity is arguably an attempt by the state to keep control 
of security governance because the state has discretion to determine whether particular 
policing functions are core or non-core.  
 
An example of partnership policing between private security and the SAPS is in the City 
Improvement Districts (CIDs) modelled after Business Improvement Districts in American 
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cities. As discussed in Chapter 3, private security in Cape Town city centre has played a 
central role in policing the CID in the city’s pursuit to become a ‘world class’ city.228 Berg’s 
research has noted that there was ‘very little standardized co-operation …between the SAPS 
and private security in the Western Cape” prior to the creation of the CID.’229 The CID 
initiatives have facilitated a “cooperative and interactive” relationship between SAPS and the 
various private security firms that are contracted to work in the CID.230 The fact that private 
security is bound by public law when working in public spaces might explain the need for the 
security industry to work in cooperation with the public police. For example, the private 
security working in the CCDs routinely hand over suspects to the SAPS as well as do the 
‘relevant paperwork on behalf of the police and providing video footage as evidence of the 
transgression.’231 When working in public spaces private security seem to buy into the 
‘bandit-catching’ approach to policing adopted by the police.232 This is unfortunate as it 
inevitably leads to a state centric approach to policing where the private security industry 
becomes an extension of the public police.233  
 
This brief section has shown that on one hand SAPS acknowledge the important role of 
private security thorough outsourcing services to private security. However, on the other hand 
SAPS promotes a state centric approach to policing as a way of retaining power: evident 
through wide discretion to determine core from non-core policing functions and perpetuating 
a ‘bandit-catching’ approach in partnership with private security. This is a manifestation of 
the ‘junior-partner’ model that views the police as the real professionals and private security 
as mere supporters. 
 
4.5 REGULATION OF PRIVATE SECURITY 
 
This section will discuss the regulation of the private security industry in South Africa. 
Although it is widely accepted that the industry is regulated through the market, the South 
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African government has also enacted legislation to regulate the industry.234 Regulation of 
private security has been necessitated by the fact that growth of the industry has resulted in 
increasing intrusion into individuals’ personal space and ‘possible infringements of accepted 
civil liberties.’235 Shearing and Stenning observed that; 
‘Private security’s emphasis on prevention directs its surveillance not so much to 
breaches of the law … as to opportunities for such breaches. As a consequence, the 
objects of private security surveillance tend to be not just potential troublemakers but 
also those who are in a position to create such opportunities for breaches. Thus, the 
target population is greatly enlarged.’236  
 
With such wide ranging power, it is clear that the accountability and regulation of the security 
industry is of vital importance. Regulation of the private security industry in South Africa is 
needed to ‘ensure that security officers in any security discipline who interact with the public 
are trustworthy and competent.’237 Similarly, the previous Security Officers Interim Board 
stated that ‘[r]egulation is intended to ensure a legitimate, trustworthy and competent private 
security industry which is optimally capable of contributing to the achievement and 
maintenance of sufficient levels of safety and security in our country.’238 As highlighted 
earlier in the chapter, private security is held accountable mainly thorough the market to its 
clients.239 In South Africa, the government has attempted to regulate private security through 
legislation.  
 
In 1987, the Apartheid government passed the Security Officers Act to create the Security 
Officers’ Board in order to register and better regulate security companies.  This was a state 
centric inspired legislation created primarily because the government had a vested interest in 
a professional and regulated private security industry.240 The Act required composition of the 
Security Officers' Board to include six representatives from the private security industry 
selected by the Minister of Law and Order. This was problematic because the Minister was 
susceptible to abuse of power and select Board members as a form of political patronage 
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based on their personal support of the Minister’s policies.241 This state centric approach 
which gave the Minister huge powers in the regulating of the private security industry 
undermined the creation of a truly professional and independent private security industry but 
facilitated the extension of the powers and influence of the state in security governance.  
 
Unfortunately, post-1994 legislation has continued to view the private security industry as an 
extension of the state. This is because the legislation imposes state-like responsibilities on the 
private security industry. For example Section 2(1) of the 1997 Security Officers Amendment 
Act which replaced the Security Officers Act of 1987 states that the industry must act in the 
‘public interest.’ Similarly, Section 3 of the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act 
states that the objective of the Act is to ensure that the industry is regulated in order to ensure 
that it complies with ‘public and national interest.’ The Act fails to clarify the meaning of 
public and national interest. These legislations are state centric in that they show that the 
government has difficulty with viewing private security as legitimate policing actors and not 
merely supportive of the state in discharging its duties. 
 
The topical Amendment Bill (2012) has been formulated to fill regulatory gaps left by the 
Private Security Industry Regulation Act of 2001. The Amendment Bill is to formally 
establish partnership between the state and the private security industry. The Amendment Bill 
seeks to amend Section 3 of the 2001 Act to include a paragraph; that promotes ‘crime 
prevention partnerships between the private security industry and organs of the state 
responsible for crime prevention.’ This Bill does not clarify what the form of these 
partnerships. It is interesting to note that while government policy documents such as the 
NCPS and the SAPS Strategic plan 2010/2014 are consistent with the Bill on the importance 
of government partnership with private security, political rhetoric show that the current ANC 
government is still not entirely comfortable with the private security industry. The Minister of 
Police, Mr Nathi Mthetwa on commenting on the Bill in an 2012 interview with Security SA 
stated; ‘the ability of criminal networks to infiltrate the industry and the vulnerability of the 
industry to such infiltration poses a major threat to the government’s capacity to 
address crime.’242 This statement arguably undermines the notion that the private security 
industry is an important partner in the fight against crime in South Africa. Similarly, the Bill 
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seeks to amend Section 20 of the 2001 Act to include; ‘51 per cent of the ownership and 
control is exercised by South African citizens.’  The government has cited national security 
reasons for this new ownership clause. The Shadow Minister of Police for the Democratic 
Alliance, Dianne Kohler Barnard has rightly pointed out that the government has no proof to 
the allegations that foreign owned private security companies pose a threat to South Africa’s 
national security.243 This Bill is yet another example of the state centric approach to policing 
because the idea behind the bill is that non-state policing agencies cannot be trusted and 
presents potential threats to the security of citizens.  
 
This section has shown that regulation of the private security industry is influenced by a state 
centric approach to policing with the state seeking to extend state-like responsibility to the 
industry. The section also shows the contradiction of the state centric approach in regulating 
the private security industry because on one hand the industry is expected to consider the 
public interest and on the other hand the Amendment Bill (2012) gives the impression that 
the industry presents a potential security threat to the country. 
  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has analysed partnership policing between the state and private security in South 
Africa because policy documents NCPS and White Paper on Safety have reiterated the 
importance of such partnership in addressing crime. However, the chapter has highlighted 
that implementation of such partnerships have been hugely undermined by the state’s need to 
reinforce authority through pursuing a state centric approach to policing.  
 
Given the extensive powers enjoyed by private security, regulation of the industry becomes 
very important in a democratic society. A review of the regulation legislation show that South 
Africa has come a long way and the industry is expected to not only act in its own interest but 
also consider national and public interests with emphasis on promoting employment and 
human rights of employees’ and South African citizens respectively. The 2012 Private 
Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill shows that the government and the private 
security industry have a tenuous relationship. The current Zuma administration seems to 
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contradict itself by viewing the private security industry both as a viable partner in fighting 
crime and a national security threat. A change in mentality by the public police and policy 
makers is needed in order for partnership policing to succeed; the public police need to 
abandon the need to be at the centre of policing and acknowledge that non-state actors need 
not become an extension of the police to be effective, but their different policing approaches 
can bring new insights into addressing new security challenges caused by advancing 
technologies.  
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Chapter 5:  Partnership policing: community policing  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the importance of partnership policing in South Africa, and focused on 
the relationship between the state and private security. Chapter 4 showed that the historical 
relationship between the state police and private security in South Africa was based on the 
acknowledgement by the state that a single policing actor cannot provide adequate security 
provision. This chapter is an extension of Chapter 4 but will focus on partnership policing 
from the perspective of community policing. Community policing is relevant because in the 
1990s it was epitomised as the vehicle to build the strained relations between the community 
and the SAPS and also promote democratic policing in South Africa. However, a state centric 
approach to policing has had an adverse effect on community policing in South Africa as this 
Chapter will highlight. 
 
Community policing is premised on the notion that citizens are natural partners of the police 
because they have more knowledge about the challenges facing their local community. 
Community policing is consistent with the nodal approach to policing because it accepts that 
policing is everyone’s business.244 Johnston and Shearing have asserted that ‘[t]he 
mobilisation of local knowledge is fundamental to the construction of just and democratic 
forms of security governance.245 Tilley has described communities as ‘repositories of 
information.’246 Community policing at its best can build the relationship between the police 
and the local community as open communication assist both parties to understand each 
other’s values and challenges.247  
  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section considers the definitions of 
community and community policing and argues that there exists no homogenous community 
that share similar ideas on policing and crime prevention. Secondly, the chapter discusses 
policy that has influenced community policing in South Africa. The third section evaluates 
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the role of Community Police Forums (CPFs) as the main expression of community policing 
in South Africa. The last section discusses the Khayelitsha Commission on policing.   
 
5.2 Definitions of ‘community’ and ‘community policing’ 
 
Definitions of ‘community’ and ‘community policing’ undermine a state centric approach to 
policing because the state lacks the complete knowledge to implement suitable policing 
strategies without cooperation from the local community. The concepts of ‘community’ and 
‘community policing’ are complex. It is interesting to note that in academic literature 
‘community’ and ‘crime’ are ‘co-joined as a binary hierarchy, as the promotion of the former 
is envisioned as a strategy to reduce, or even defeat, the latter.’248  I think the reason for this 
is related to Crawford’s observation that ‘[c]ommunities are often portrayed as the antithesis 
of violence and crime. On the contrary, however, the collective values of a community may 
serve to stimulate and sustain criminality.’249 Notwithstanding the challenges of community 
being an ‘open textured concept’ Taylor has given a useful working definition of 
‘community.’250 Taylor has observed that there are three attributes common to all 
communities:  
‘The first and most basic of these ‘core’ characteristics is that a set of persons who 
compose a community have beliefs and values in common ... The second characteristic 
is that relations between members should be direct and they should be many-sided. 
Relations are direct to the extent that they are unmediated — by representatives, 
leaders, bureaucrats, institutions such as those of the state, or by codes, abstractions 
and reifications ... The third and final characteristic of community is that of 
reciprocity.’251  
 
Clarke rightly points out that communities are sites of governance, which are influenced by 
plural actors with competing and contradictory value systems.252 Indeed, communities are 
contested constructions and not ‘naturally occurring entities.’253  This does not mean that the 
‘community’ lacks political and social capital but that it ‘cannot be taken for granted’ as has 
been evidenced by the challenges of implementing community policing.254  
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There lacks consensus on the definition of community policing. Eck and Rosenbaum argue 
that community policing is ‘simultaneously ambitious and ambiguous’ which has been 
popular as ‘a plastic concept, meaning different things to different people.’255 Similarly 
Gordon asserts that because the concept of community policing is vague, it enables the 
various role players to adapt the meaning to suit their own interests.256 The concept of 
community policing presupposes to a huge extent the existence of a homogenous united 
community that share the same vision of community and crime prevention.  However, the 
legacy of apartheid in South Africa means that community policing is understood differently 
across racial and socio-economic lines. The affluent, predominantly white communities tend 
to support ‘community-driven solutions to crime, black people in poorer areas would prefer 
to see intervention by national government and more effective policing.’257 This diversity of 
approaches across different communities highlights the importance of a nodal approach to 
policing because it shows that the state will have difficulty anticipating differing security 
needs without the cooperation of other policing actors working in these communities. 
 
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux have produced an authoritative definition of community 
policing. They argue that it is a policing philosophy; ‘based on the concept that police 
officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary 
community problems related to crime, social and physical disorder, and neighbourhood 
decay.’258 Traditional policing performed by the public police is bureaucratic and primarily 
concerned with ‘crime control, limited public interaction, random (motorised) patrol, shift 
work, coordinated central dispatch and territorial organisation of responsibility.’259 On the 
other hand, community policing broadens the police mandate ‘from a narrow crime fighting 
one to one that addresses wider issues such as fear of crime, social and physical disorder and 
neighbourhood problems.’260 Community policing would therefore regard the fighting of 
crime not as an end in itself. Improving the community’s quality of life so that citizens can 
                                                
255 Eck, John and Rosenbaum, Dennis ‘The new police order: Effectiveness, equity, and 
efficiency in community policing’ in Rosenbaum, Dennis (ed) The challenge of community policing: Testing the 
promise (1994) 3 
256 Gordon, Diana ‘Democratic consolidation and community policing: Conflicting imperatives in South Africa’ 
(2001) 11 Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 136. 
257 Newham, Gareth ‘Strengthening democratic policing in South Africa through internal systems for officer 
control’ (2005) 36 South African Review of Sociology 182. 
258 Trojanowicz, Robert and Bucqueroux, Bonnie Community policing: A contemporary perspective (1990) 5 
259 Manning  op cit (n71). 
Trojanowicz, Robert and Bucquerox Bonnie Community policing: a contemporary perspective  2nd ed (1998) 260  
53 
 
 
 
feel secure and can enjoy their environment is viewed as equally important. This 
understanding of community policing is consistent with a holistic nodal approach outlined in 
the NCPS which does not focus exclusively on the criminal justice system but seeks to work 
with different state and non-state actors that can make a direct or indirect impact on crime 
prevention.  
 
This section has shown that definitions of community and community policing necessitate a 
nodal approach to policing because the state cannot adequately provide security provision 
without the insights and cooperation of the local community.   
 
5.3 Community policing in South Africa 
 
I disagree with Brogden’s statement that ‘community policing is as American as cherry 
pie.’261 This is because community policing is not an American phenomenon. Baker makes a 
valid point which is that community policing is not new in South Africa.262 The public police 
in South Africa was only centralised in 1913. This police mostly operated in urban areas and 
in rural areas communities were, and arguably still are, responsible for their own security 
provision. Before 1913 ‘all policing was local, voluntary and discretionary, whether by 
African villages and clans, or by white collective responses in the “frontier spirit.”263 This 
undermines the state-centric approach to policing that seeks to have monopoly on policing 
because historically security governance in South Africa was conducted by multiple actors. 
 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter the apartheid state recognised the necessity for 
policing to be conducted by multiple actors. When the apartheid government was facing 
political challenges in the 1970s and 1980s the government enrolled white citizens to co-
operate with the state through the creation of local intelligence structures to identify 
organised resistance against the state.264 The Minister of Police and the Commissioner of 
Police were the driving force behind Neighbourhood Watch schemes being enacted in white 
neighbourhoods throughout South Africa in 1985. The main idea behind these schemes was 
to protect private property in these neighbourhoods through encouraging the residents to 
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actively pursue surveillance and work in cooperation with the police.265 Schärf has asserted 
that the abolishment of the Influx Control laws in 1986 proved to be a rallying point for some 
of the neighbourhood watches because some members of these watches ‘seem to have 
assumed that the mere presence of black people on their street constituted ‘suspicious’ 
behaviour.’266 The state police was not interested in protecting all South African citizens 
which meant that black communities were left to cater for their own security. Again this 
created a wide range of security governance: informal justice which encompassed a wide 
range of policing initiatives ranging from dispute resolution forums to street committees.267 
Informal justice developed out of traditions and customs that promote ‘the reconciliation of 
disputing parties and the restoration of harmony within the community.’268 This shares some 
similarity with community policing which values mediation in order to solve community 
problems and restore order and ‘harmony.’269 Indeed, Gordon has noted that the concept of 
community policing was popular in South Africa precisely because of this link to traditional 
communitarian principles.270  
 
Community policing became prominent during discussions on police reform in the early 
1990s. Brogden and Shearing have asserted that the state police ‘ensured that sustained 
brutality’ was experienced by blacks during the apartheid period.271 This meant that for the 
majority of the population, the state police as an institution was distrusted and viewed as a 
symbol of state abuse and harassment. The new democratic government faced the challenge 
of building the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of South African citizens after the end of 
apartheid. Policy makers and civil society argued that community policing would be an 
important platform to mend the relationship between local communities and the SAPS. The 
1995 Police Service Act, Section 18(1) advocated for a collaborative partnership between 
SAPS and their local communities to enable ‘joint problem identification and problem-
solving.’ Similarly, the then Department of Safety and Security (1997) defined community 
policing as ‘a collaborative, partnership-based approach to local level problem solving.’ In 
1997, the Community Policing Policy Framework and Guidelines was published by the 
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Department of Safety and Security. The document outlined the five elements of community 
policing policy:   
• service orientation- which is providing a professional SAPS to address community 
needs  
• partnership- which facilitates cooperation between SAPS and the local community 
•  problem-solving -with the objective being the identification of the root causes of 
crime 
• empowerment which consists of giving the local community a role in addressing 
crime in their area  
• Accountability- in which the police is held accountable in the implementation of their 
duties by the community.272  
 
However, the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security dramatically changed government 
policy on community policing. This paper outlined community policing, not as a vehicle to 
hold the police accountable to its community but as a ‘bedrock of effective law enforcement’ 
thus promoting a state centric approach to policing.273 Community policing is then viewed as 
a police instrument which provides ‘intelligence for police and other local officials 
('[identifying flashpoints, crime patterns and community anti-crime priorities').’274 This 
makes community policing an extension of the police; a useful resource in local security 
networks.275 Dixon rightly points out that the SAPS was now not ‘only back in control of 
policing, but under clear instructions to prosecute the fight against crime using tactics that 
owed as much to aggressive order maintenance as community problem-solving.’276 This state 
centric approach to community policing in which the SAPS is at the centre of policing and 
the community plays a secondary role as a junior partner to the police undermines the 
collaborative partnership between the police and the community envisaged in the 1995 Police 
Service Act. Community policing requires a paradigm shift from the well-entrenched 
traditional notion that the police and the criminal justice system are the best placed 
institutions to address crime.277 Otherwise, community policing is reduced to another 
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‘mechanism to achieve better bandit catching, than a way of involving the police in wider 
strategies to enhance community involvement in crime prevention.’278 This is particularly 
unfortunate for poor communities because a state centric approach to policing fails to ‘shift 
the focus of policing resources to poor areas’ by giving the inhabitants a voice in their 
security governance.279 
 
Gordon has questioned the South African government’s commitment to community policing 
because it has failed to invest the necessary resources: both financial and the person power 
needed to successfully implement community policing.280 One of the challenges facing 
community policing has been the failure of the SAPS to address issues of limited resources 
and corruption. Partnership between the police and communities can be implemented through 
the community giving under-resourced police financial assistance. Unfortunately this can 
encourage corruption and impede on accountability.281 It is challenging to hold the police 
accountable in a state centric approach to policing. This is because such an approach creates a 
hierarchy; with the police being given more authority than the community. The next section 
will discuss the accountability of police through the Community Police Forums. 
 
5.4 Community Police Forums: vehicles to community policing? 
 
Community Police Forums (CPFs) were viewed as the vehicle to implement community 
policing. Pelser rightly noted that CPFs were ‘the most visible, if not the only, expression of 
South Africa's community policing policy.’282 The 1994 Interim Constitution created the 
Community Police Forums (CPFs) at every police station throughout the country. The CPFs 
were established in 1995 with the aim of holding the SAPS accountable to the local 
communities as well as foster a collaborative relationship in which the SAPS work in 
partnership with local communities to tackle crime prevention. These forums are comprised 
of a committee of representatives from the community who work in close cooperation with 
their local police. However, Hansen has made an interesting observation which is that in 
some areas CPFs are dominated by ‘self-styled representatives of the ‘community’ [who 
range from] long-standing foes of the police – ANC activists and others active in the anti-
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apartheid movement – while others were local self-styled leaders, religious figures, and 
people who had been active in apartheid’s political institutions.’283 Research has shown that 
CPF participants are not necessarily representative of their communities. CPFs particularly in 
black areas are not representatives of the community; the elite in these communities (teachers 
and ministers) often retired, have the time to be actively involved in these forums resulting in 
the exclusion of the youth and women.284 Gordon asserts that the SAPS ignore this tendency 
because ‘the better educated people in the community are the easiest to communicate with, 
but they aren't likely to provide information on the most serious crime problems.’285  
 
Implementation of community policing has differed across racial and socio-economic lines. 
Newham rightly asserts that evaluating CPFs is challenging because implementation of CPF 
policy has varied immensely across communities: poor communities with limited resources 
have struggled to implement successful CPFs and high income communities which tend to be 
white areas have had more success in implementing CPFs policies.286 This has led to 
criticisms that attempting to implement a western approach of community policing in South 
Africa is ‘inappropriate to the social and historical context.’287 Brogden argues that the 
Western donors and academics who promoted the implementation of community policing in 
South Africa failed to recognise the conflicting diversities in South Africa not only along 
racial lines but economic and social inequalities.288 He further asserts that Western concepts 
in relation to policing and community ‘do not easily translate’ to the South African context. 
Brogden has suggested that in order for community policing to be successful they ‘must draw 
on local experiences’ and borrow from the west: only when there exists ‘an attested record of 
success’ and implementation is carried out with the respect of local knowledge and 
conditions.289  
 
The advocates of CPFs were academics and civil society who had been active in the anti-
apartheid movement and viewed community policing as a means of involving civic 
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participation in the new democratic South Africa.290 However, as mentioned in the previous 
section, by the late 1990s, government priority and focus was not on democratic policing but 
on addressing the high levels of crime in the country which led to the SAPS adopting a more 
aggressive stance to policing shifting away from democratic policing.291 This change in 
policy was problematic and resulted in a situation in which the community and the SAPS 
have different expectations from these CPFs – the former expecting to be involved in police 
initiatives and the latter seeking to develop the CPF into “eyes and ears” mechanism for 
crime control.’292  
 
Research has identified that CPFs have been unsuccessful due to lack of resources and a 
failure by the participants to adhere to policy and legislation guidelines.293 Furthermore, there 
has been misunderstanding over partnership: the SAPS have viewed partnership as a means 
to acquire ‘additional resources for general policing purposes or, in some instances, crime 
prevention activities’ and members of the CPF saw it as a means to hold the police 
accountable to the community.294 Research has shown that most police officers think that 
community policing is not a realistic strategy especially in high crime areas.295 Furthermore, 
CPFs have for the most part failed to hold police accountable.296 Newham argues that this 
failure to provide oversight of the police is not surprising because; 
‘there is a tension between the objective of building community police partnerships 
and communities overseeing the police. In some instances, where the CPF has taken it 
upon itself to expose police corruption or abuses, this has generally led to deterioration 
in the community-police relationships.’297  
 
This section has shown that CPFs have been ineffective because of lack of resources; which 
has led Brogden to assert that community policing is a western concept that fails to take the 
social and historical background of South Africa. One can argue that the primarily reason for 
the failure of the CPFs is the state centric approach to policing adopted by the government. In 
the 1990s community policing was promoted as an example of democratic policing that can 
facilitate the building of relationships between the state police and the community after the 
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years of police brutality under the apartheid regime. However, by the end of the 1990s the 
fight against high crime meant that the SAPS adopted a state centric approach in their 
community policing which viewed the local community as a police instrument to enforce law 
enforcement. This undermined the effective implementation of partnership policing that is 
focused on problem solving and implementing crime prevention initiatives at the local level. 
A state centric approach to policing also creates challenges on the issue of police 
accountability. 
 
5.5 A failure in partnership policing: examining the Khayelitsha Commission on 
policing 
 
The Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha, or simply 
known as the Khayelitsha Commission was established in 2012 by the Premier of Western 
Cape. Section 206 (5) of the South African Constitution states; at the provisional level a 
commission of inquiry can be appointed to investigate ‘any complaints of police inefficiency 
or a breakdown in relations between the police and any community.’ Section 206 (5) (b) 
requires the commission to make recommendations on how the situation can be rectified. The 
mandate of the commission is to investigate allegations of incompetence of the SAPS 
operating in the three stations in Khayelitsha which has resulted in a breakdown in relations 
between the SAPS and the Khayelitsha community.  
 
The first public sitting of the Khayelitsha Commission was held on the 23rd of January 2014. 
Khayelitsha is a large township in Cape Town that is plagued by poverty, high crime rates, 
gangs and vigilante activity.298 Khayelitsha has the highest recorded per capita crime in the 
country with 354 people recorded to have been murdered according to the SAPS figures that 
were released in September 2013.299 The evidence from this first session showed that a high 
number of crimes were not reported to the police because the police was viewed as uncaring 
and unwilling to address any concerns from the community.300 When the community does 
report crime, shortage of staff and resources mean that the police are ill equipped to meet the 
demand for service.301 For example, information before the Commission pointed out the fact 
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that ‘in three police stations in Khayelitsha the basic building blocks required for a functional 
police service are either broken, dysfunctional or missing altogether.’302For example, poor 
sanitation particularly makes women vulnerable to attacks when they are walking long 
distances at night to access toilets. The Advocate representing the SAPS before the 
Commission, Mr Arendse made a compelling point which is that the police working in 
Khayelitsha have a wide range of impediments which affect them in fulfilling their duties; the 
‘highly dense informal housing in several areas, the very narrow foot paths, the lack of roads, 
infrastructure and lighting make policing virtually impossible.’303 This dire shortage of 
personnel and resources suggest that the state lack capacity to have monopoly over security 
governance in Khayelitsha.  
 
The Khayelitsha Commission, shows that local communities seek alternative sources of 
providing security when the state fails to fulfil its mandate to provide security. Menkhaus has 
rightly asserted that ‘local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and 
insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase predictability 
in their dangerous environments.’304 However, the unfortunate consequence of alternative 
source of policing is that some non-state actors fail to respect human rights or adhere to due 
process and promote informal justice.305 Evidence from the second public sitting of the 
Khayelitsha Commission suggested that young people join gangs and vigilante groups as a 
means of seeking protection. Furthermore, in an ironic way the gangs end up increasing the 
level of unrest in the community. Mr Mbotshelwa the principal of Esangweni Secondary 
school in Khayelitsha has said that the increase of gangs in Khayelitsha has led to dropouts 
because of students’ fear of being attacked by gang members.306 Siphosethu Peter a sixteen 
year old student at Esangweni Secondary School stated; “I wish something can be done to 
stop these fights. Every day when the fights start I’m using a back door to escape. Even 
inside the school we live in fear of what is going to happen after school-time.” 307 Similarly, 
in the second public of the Khayelitsha Commission, Mr Zitwana a community leader in the 
area stated that the one of the Neighbourhood Watch schemes came to an abrupt end in 2009 
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because of violence. He explained that the Neighbourhood Watch ended up physically 
abusing members of the community walking in the streets after ten pm as they argued that ‘if 
you are walking in the streets at night you are challenging violence or crime because you are 
calling these people to come and rob you.’308 The above example highlight Marks and 
Goldsmith’s (2006) concern discussed in Chapter 2 of non-state actors acting in a heavy 
handed undemocratic manner.309   
 
Similarly, the Zanokhano Business Association and the SAPS community crisis committee 
gave foreign owned businesses operating in Khayelitsha a two day notice to pack up and 
leave the area in order to prevent violent attacks on the immigrants.310 Mr Mfundisi Mbekwa 
the chairperson of the SAPS community crisis committee claimed that “[w]e have the right to 
close the shops in terms of the agreement we had in 2008 after xenophobic attacks. It was 
agreed that no more new Somali traders should operate around Khayelitsha.”311 A local 
business woman who was part of the SAPS community crisis committee meeting made an 
interesting statement; “We are suffering because of them. Police are aware of the agreement, 
but are failing to do their job of closing the (new) shops.”312 The issuing of a two day’s notice 
to foreign owned businesses was conducted by non-state actors involved in security 
governance in Khayelitsha. Again this questions the commitment and capability non-state 
actors have in protecting vulnerable members of the community such as immigrants from 
xenophobic attacks.  
 
However, notwithstanding the capacity of non-state policing actors to act contrary to 
democratic principles, it is not necessarily the case that the state will normatively be able to 
provide for the public good and adhere to democratic principles that respect to individual 
human rights. The Commission highlighted that the SAPS has abused its powers in 
Khayelitsha. Likhona Njamela who works as a volunteer for Khayelitsha civil organisation 
Social Justice Coalition (SJC) claims that she and a group of residents in Green Point 
Khayelitsha watched police physically assault a group of teenage gang members with water 
pipes in 2012. She stated that the police ‘wanted to beat everyone who was on the scene. We 
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told them ‘no guys, you can't do this.’ The residents were angry and started throwing stones 
at the police van.’313 A state centric approach is clearly not the best option to redress 
challenges in security governance in Khayelitsha; a strategy that enables the community and 
the SAPS to collaborate in problem solving and crime prevention initiatives is needed. It is 
interesting to note that despite the allegations of police brutality, the Khayelitsha community 
wants an increase in the visibility of the police and requested an increase in the number of 
police working in Khayelitsha.314 The Khayelitsha community and the SAPS were in 
agreement that partnership policing was needed to effectively tackle the crime problem in the 
area.315  There was also an acknowledgement that social conditions that facilitate crime such 
as structural poverty and poor service delivery are beyond the scope of the police.316 As 
highlighted earlier in the chapter, CPFs are one way of facilitating partnership policing 
between the SAPS and the community. However, the CPFs in Khayelitsha have been 
unsuccessful due to lack of resources, disorganisation and lack of co-ordination among the 
various policing actors acting in Khayelitsha.317 Another impediment to the CPFs in 
Khayelitsha is the lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the community.318 The state and non-state 
policing actors would need to build a relationship with the community in order to address 
security challenges in Khayelitsha. 
 
This section has shown that the Khayelitsha Commission reiterated the fact that the police are 
not capable of being all things to all people and need to work in co-operation with non-state 
policing actors. The Khayelitsha Commission has reiterated the important value that the 
community places on the police; which is to be contrasted to a state centric approach. Indeed 
the Commission noted that the state is incapable and lacks resources to have the monopoly of 
policing in Khayelitsha. There exists consensus that partnership policing between the SAPS 
and the Khayelitsha community is important to implement effective security governance in 
Khayelitsha. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Defining community policing is challenging because it arguably has become everything to 
everyone. This chapter has attempted to show that notions of ‘community’ are based on the 
assumption that there exists a homogenous group; however, issues of social and economic 
inequality have been shown to undermine implementation of community policing. The main 
vehicle in implementing community policing in South Africa have been the CPFs which has 
the mandate to work in partnership with the SAPS as well as  hold the local police 
accountable. The CPFs have been unsuccessful especially in low income black areas such as 
Khayelitsha because of a lack of resources and a misunderstanding on the purpose of CPFs. 
The state centric approach to policing which developed as the government’s response to the 
high crime rates undermined community policing; by turning it to a law enforcement 
mechanism. The Khayelitsha Commission has reiterated the importance of community 
policing; state and non-state policing actors working in cooperation with local communities 
to solve problems and implement crime prevention strategies.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has shown that the empirical reality in South Africa is that the state never 
had and does not have the monopoly on security governance; private security and various 
forms of community policing have been a feature of security governance throughout the 
country’s history. Kempa et al have observed that ‘[t]he state as the monopolist of 
governance is historically more a rhetorical device than a reality, and contemporarily nothing 
better than a maladaptive chimera.’319 Indeed private security and other forms of crime 
prevention initiatives ‘have been present in the earliest known forms of prehistoric 
civilizations.’320 The strategy adopted by most governments to encourage citizens to take 
responsibility for their security is recognition of the plurality of policing actors in security 
governance. Indeed, the different theoretical approaches to policing notably the nodal model 
and the state-anchored pluralism model are in agreement about the existence of the plurality 
of policing actors. One can argue that these two models are more similar than different with 
both models concerned with providing equitable policing provision albeit using different 
approaches which need not be contradictory.  
 
Notwithstanding the empirical fact that security provision can be adequately provided by 
non-state actors, this dissertation has shown that the SAPS have attempted to monopolise 
policing; whether in collaboration with private security in the CID areas or in implementation 
of community policing. Steinberg has rightly pointed out that SAPS want to be at the centre 
of policing in order to build legitimacy in the eyes of South African citizens. This is because 
SAPS lacks the Hobbesian monopoly of force, as evidenced by their conduct in South 
Africa’s townships, where security is ‘bought, sold and bartered, and also exchanged for 
solidarity and friendship.’321 Steinberg furthermore states that the police in a democratic 
society will retreat when they lack the mandate of their society.  
 
This dissertation has shown that formulating original forward thinking policy documents such 
as the NCPS is useful to the extent that implementation of these policies takes place. It is 
important for policy to be grounded in reality in order for it to go beyond mere rhetoric and 
get implemented. The Khayelitsha Commission highlights the importance of a paradigm shift 
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in the manner security governance is viewed in South Africa. The Khayelitsha Commission 
has pointed out the importance the police has in the public’s perception of security provision; 
the community wanted an increase in the visibility of the SAPS in their area. However, the 
Khayelitsha Commission highlighted that there was an acknowledgement by all stakeholders 
that the SAPS was under resourced and lacked capacity to effect equal security provision; 
therefore, partnership policing between SAPS and the community was advocated. This 
position suggests that an alternative policing approach which gives the SAPS a role as well as 
acknowledges other policing actors is need; minimal policing is a plausible alternative, 
particularly ‘where police legitimacy is in question and there are very limited state 
resources.’322 Marks and Wood (2010) have made a compelling argument that a shift towards 
a minimalist approach is needed in a developing country such as South Africa.323   
 
 
6.1 MINIMAL POLICING: a plausible compromise 
 
Minimal policing is a credible alternative to the ineffective state centric approach to policing. 
This is because it does not entirely reject the role of the state in policing but promotes a 
clearly defined role for the state police that are consistent with the reality of what the state’s 
capabilities, while at the same time recognising the role and position of non-state policing 
actors. Minimalist policing is defined as, ‘police intervention [that] should be confined to 
cases where there is clear evidence of law-breaking, and [that] should take the form of the 
invocation of legal powers and criminal process.’324 The position is not state centric but an 
extension of the nodal approach; with the police having a minimal clearly defined role and 
non-state policing actor’s initiatives being ‘supported and recognized.’325 The minimalist 
position essentially maintains that state police do not have the monopoly in security 
governance but they ensure that ‘publicly agreed upon norms for policing are adhered’ in a 
manner that promotes public safety.326 The minimalist position is consistent with the nodal 
approach to policing because the state’s role is not a normative given but dependent on the 
capacity of the state in a given context. 
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Marks and Wood have outlined four benefits of minimal policing. Firstly, regulating and 
monitoring policing actors would be easier if the role of the police is clearly defined. 
Secondly, minimal policing will build the needed legitimacy of the SAPS as they act in a 
democratic manner through the use of unique skills and resources in response to community 
needs. Thirdly, when the SAPS is clear in their clearly defined role that is realistic to their 
capabilities and resources, ‘a space will be created for them to actively encourage and even to 
learn from alternative (non-state) ways of framing problems and developing solutions.’327 
The last benefit is that minimal policing is consistent to ‘what the police want’ which is 
engaging in ‘real police work while at the same time doing what the community wants them 
to do.’328 Expanding on the necessity of minimal policing, Altbeker rightly points out that 
SAPS cannot be expected to address the inequality in society; they are not trained, equipped 
or best placed to do so.329 Steinberg supports Altbeker’s position that the SAPS ‘ought to 
have drawn upon a tradition of police minimalism’ and restricted their activity to functions 
neglected by the apartheid police: ‘investigation of crime and the management of 
emergencies.’330  Altbeker makes a valid point which is consistent with the nodal approach to 
policing; the state should not ‘bite more than it can chew’ but take on responsibility it is 
equipped and resourced to tackle.  Minimal policing is a plausible compromise between state 
centric policing and innovative forward looking policing approaches. The National 
Development Plan (NDP) 2030 is consistent with minimal policing because it advocates for 
an integrated approach in which state and non-state policing actors work in collaboration in 
the security governance in South Africa.331 
 
6.2 The National Development Plan (NDP) 
 
In 2012, The National Planning Commission produced a National Development Plan 2030 in 
which an integrated whole of society approach to safety and security issues was advocated. 
The NDP like the NEDCOR report discussed in Chapter 3 highlighted that the high crime 
levels in South Africa have had an adverse effect on ‘social and economic development.’332 
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However, the NDP differ with the NEDCOR report as the latter took a state centric approach 
and argued for the state to have primary responsibility of security governance. The NDP 
advocates a minimal approach to policing and argues that the SAPS is not ‘an all-purpose 
agency’ but a ‘highly specialised resource to be deployed strategically.’333 The NDP takes a 
nodal approach to policing by stating that effective security governance needs partnership 
between ‘the criminal justice system, local government, the community, private sector and 
role players involved in economic and social development.’334 The NDP also advocates for a 
long-term sustainable ‘integrated approach focused on tackling the fundamental causes of 
criminality.’335  This is consistent with the NCPS of 1996 which promoted partnerships in 
crime prevention.  
 
The NDP suggests that the state centric approaches to policing might in future be replaced by 
a more holistic approach to tackling crime. Indeed, if implemented the NDP is a signal  that 
in the government has realised that the current tough on crime approach is not effective as the 
SAPS lacks the resources and capability to be at the centre of security governance; minimal 
policing that is based on the nodal approach to policing might be more appropriate for a 
developing country.  
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